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INTRODUCTION 
It has now become common, at least among progressive 
criminal justice scholars, to argue that the criminal justice 
system could be fixed—or at least greatly improved—if we sim-
ply regulated prosecutors more.  If we curbed their unfettered 
discretion.1  If they sought less harsh punishments.  Or if they 
charged fewer people, which arguably has contributed more to 
mass incarceration than the War on Drugs.2  If we required 
† Professor of Law and Director of the Center on Race, Law, and Justice, 
Fordham Law School. B.A. Princeton University; J.D. Columbia Law School.  As-
sistant U.S. Attorney, Southern District of New York 1995–2004.  E-mail: ca-
pers@fordham.edu.  This Article benefited from presentations at NYU School of 
Law’s Policing Colloquium; faculty workshops at Albany Law School, University of 
Nevada Las Vegas Law School, GW Law School, Suffolk University Law School, 
University of Georgia School of Law, New York Law School, Brooklyn Law School, 
Fordham Law School; and from presentations at CrimFest and the Law and Soci-
ety Conference.  For comments, suggestions, and feedback, I am especially grate-
ful to Miriam Baer, Alice Ristroph, Deborah Weissman, Ronald Wright, Bruce 
Green, Olivier Sylvain, Cynthia Lee, Roger Fairfax, Kate Weisburd, Eric Miller, 
Barbara Fedders, Leigh Goodmark, Julia Simon-Kerr, Jeremy Bearer-Friend, 
Thea Johnson, Jenia Iontcheva Turner, Anna Roberts, Jenny Roberts, Sandra 
Mayson, Daniel Greenwood, Rachel Barkow, Barry Friedman, Jocelyn Simonson, 
Rachel Harmon, Stephanos Bibas, Robin Lenhardt, Youngjae Lee, and Jed 
Shugerman.  Hector Melendez and Alanna Phillips provided invaluable research 
assistance. 
1 ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR 
15–17, 192–94 (2007). 
2 JOHN F. PFAFF, LOCKED  IN: THE  TRUE  CAUSES OF  MASS  INCARCERATION—AND 
HOW TO ACHIEVE REAL REFORM 206 (2017) (concluding that “[p]rosecutors have been 
and remain the engines driving mass incarceration”); see also EMILY  BAZELON, 
CHARGED: THE NEW MOVEMENT TO TRANSFORM AMERICAN PROSECUTION AND END MASS 
INCARCERATION 77–81 (2019) (arguing that prosecutors bear much of the responsi-
bility for over-incarceration). 
1561 
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them to have open file discovery—the ’220 norm in civil cases— 
instead of keeping evidence, even exculpatory evidence, close to 
the vest.3  If they confronted their implicit biases about race 
and class and everything else.4  If we limited their power to 
coerce pleas5 or fixed things so the prosecutors who investigate 
and advocate are not the same prosecutors who in effect adju-
dicate decisions.6  The suggestions continue.  If we elected pro-
gressive prosecutors.7  If we at least leveled the funding 
between prosecutors and public defenders.8  I too made some 
of these arguments.9  Not anymore. 
3 Cf. Miriam H. Baer, Timing Brady, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 43, 57–58 (2015) 
(exploring timing and institutional design as a way to increase prosecutorial com-
pliance with discovery obligations). See generally Alafair S. Burke, Revisiting 
Prosecutorial Disclosure, 84 IND. L.J. 481, 514 (2009) (arguing for open-file discov-
ery); Darryl K. Brown, The Decline of Defense Counsel and the Rise of Accuracy in 
Criminal Adjudication, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 1585, 1637 (2005) (similar). 
4 Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124, 
1139–42 (2012) (discussing implicit biases among prosecutors); Robert J. Smith 
& Justin D. Levinson, The Impact of Implicit Racial Bias on the Exercise of 
Prosecutorial Discretion, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 795, 797 (2012) (arguing that 
“implicit racial attitudes and stereotypes skew prosecutorial decisions in a range 
of racially biased ways”). 
5 See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market: From 
Caveat Emptor to Consumer Protection, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1117, 1151–60 (2011) 
(proposing protections for defendants who enter into plea bargains similar to 
protections for consumer contracts); I. Bennett Capers, The Prosecutor’s Turn, 57 
WM & MARY L. REV. 1277, 1299–1305 (2016) [hereinafter Capers, The Prosecutor’s 
Turn] (discussing plea bargaining in the context of the Due Process Clause); Eric 
S. Fish, Against Adversary Prosecution, 103 IOWA L. REV. 1419, 1444–45 (2018) 
(“American criminal justice is essentially a system of negotiated dispositions ad-
ministered by prosecutors.”). 
6 See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecu-
tors: Lessons from Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869, 898 (2009) (arguing 
that borrowing from the institutional design inherent in administrative law 
checks could do much to rein in prosecutorial excess). 
7 BAZELON, supra note 2, at 147–95; Angela J. Davis, The Progressive Prose-
cutor: An Imperative for Criminal Justice Reform, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 1 (2018) 
(urging the election of more progressive prosecutors); cf. David Alan Sklansky, The 
Progressive Prosecutor’s Handbook, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. ONLINE 25, 27 (2017) 
(providing ten suggestions of “best practices” for progressive district attorneys). 
8 WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 299 (2011); 
David Rudovsky, Gideon and the Effective Assistance of Counsel: The Rhetoric and 
the Reality, 32 LAW & INEQ. 371, 377–82 (2014) (discussing the depth of the 
funding crisis); Eve Brensike Primus, Defense Counsel and Public Defense, in 3 
REFORMING CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PRETRIAL AND TRIAL PROCESSES 121, 123–26 (Erik Luna 
ed. 2017); Note, Effectively Ineffective: The Failure of Courts to Address Un-
derfunded Indigent Defense Systems, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1733–35 (2005). 
9 See, e.g., I. Bennett Capers, Cross Dressing and the Criminal, 20 YALE J. OF 
L. & HUMAN. 1, 22–30 (2008) (overviewing exercises of perspective “switching” for 
actors in the criminal justice system); Bennett Capers, Real Rape Too, 99 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1259, 1299–1300 (2011) [hereinafter Capers, Real Rape Too] (arguing for 
gender-neutrality and better training for prosecutors of sexual assault); Capers, 
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The argument I put forward in this Article may seem radi-
cal, but if I may channel Ralph Ellison, “[b]ear with me.”10 
Because I subscribe to the belief that “subject position is every-
thing in my analysis of the law,”11 it is worth disclosing that I 
come to this argument not just as a criminal justice scholar but 
also as a former federal prosecutor.  That argument is this: it is 
time to turn away from prosecution as we know it.  As a federal 
prosecutor I put hundreds of defendants, mostly brown and 
black and almost always poor, in prison as part of the War on 
Drugs.  But if the goal was to limit the influx of drugs in this 
country, what I did was an abject failure.12  And it is not just 
drug prosecutions.  Even looking back on many of the other 
cases I prosecuted involving victimless “crimes” I certainly 
know I did more harm than good.  I certainly contributed to 
mass incarceration and to the separation of families.  But to 
what end? 
Just consider.  Each year our jails cycle through approxi-
mately ten million people, the vast majority charged with non-
violent crimes.13  We are at a point where one in every three 
adults in America has a criminal record,14 and where for every 
fifteen persons born in 2001, one will likely spend time in jail or 
prison.15  Compared to other countries, the crime rate in the 
The Prosecutor’s Turn, supra note 5, at 1299–1305 (discussing heightened due 
process requirements for prosecutors who plea bargain). 
10 RALPH ELLISON, INVISIBLE MAN 12 (1952). 
11 PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE  ALCHEMY OF  RACE AND  RIGHTS 3 (1991) (“Since 
subject position is everything in my analysis of the law, you deserve to know that 
it’s a bad morning.”). 
12 See MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE 
OF COLORBLINDNESS 60 (rev. ed. 2012) (arguing that the war on drugs is the “single 
most important cause of the explosion in incarceration rates in the United 
States”). See generally STEVEN WISOTSKY, BEYOND THE WAR ON DRUGS: OVERCOMING A 
FAILED PUBLIC POLICY 8 (1990) (“One way or another, no matter what the War on 
Drugs does to supply, the black market in cocaine will play its trump: it thrives on 
enforcement, depends on it.”); PAULA MALLEA, THE WAR ON DRUGS: A FAILED EXPERI-
MENT 11 (2014) (“It is by now indisputable that the War on Drugs has failed in all of 
its objectives.”). 
13 ZHEN ZENG, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 251210, JAIL INMATES IN 2016, at 1 
(2018), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ji16.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
TDW6-B2K4] (noting that “[j]ails reported 10.6 million admissions during 2016”). 
14 CHIDI UMEZ & REBECCA PIRIUS, BARRIERS TO WORK: IMPROVING EMPLOYMENT IN 
LICENSED  OCCUPATIONS FOR  INDIVIDUALS WITH  CRIMINAL  RECORDS 1 (2018), https:// 
www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/Documents/Labor/Licensing/criminalRecords_v06_ 
web.pdf [https://perma.cc/JT77-R98T]; THE SENTENCING PROJECT, AMERICANS WITH 
CRIMINAL  RECORDS 1 (2014), https://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/up 
loads/2015/11/Americans-with-Criminal-Records-Poverty-and-Opportunity-
Profile.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y3Z3-RLRP]. 
15 THOMAS P. BONCZAR, U.S. DEP’T OF  JUSTICE, NCJ 197976, PREVALENCE OF 
IMPRISONMENT IN THE U.S. POPULATION, 1974–2001 7 (2003), https://www.bjs.gov/ 
content/pub/pdf/piusp01.pdf [https://perma.cc/7BTT-SXDS]. 
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United States is not exceptional,16 and yet we have by far the 
highest incarceration rate in the world.17  None of this can be 
solved by simply tinkering with the machinery of prosecution. 
It is time to rethink why and how we prosecute in the first 
place. 
What would it mean to turn away from public prosecutors 
and not rely on the criminal justice system as the first re-
sponder to address social ills, such as mental illness and pov-
erty (two of the main drivers of our prison industrial complex)? 
More radically, what would it mean to turn away from state-
controlled prosecution as the primary way to address crime? 
What would it mean to replace a system where prosecutors 
hold a monopoly in deciding which cases are worthy of pursuit 
with a system in which “we the people,” including those of us 
who have traditionally had little power, would be empowered to 
seek and achieve justice ourselves? 
This Article attempts to answer these questions.  It begins 
in Part I with the enormous, monopolistic power public prose-
cutors wield.  But this power is not inevitable.  Indeed, public 
prosecutors are not even inevitable.  This is the main point of 
Part II, which surfaces the rarely discussed history of criminal 
prosecutions in this country before the advent of the public 
prosecutor, when private prosecutions were the norm and in a 
very real sense criminal prosecutions belonged to “the people.” 
Part II then demonstrates that our history of private prosecu-
tions and the turn to public prosecutions is more than just a 
curious footnote, as this very history has, in turn, shaped crim-
inal law and justice as we know it.  Part III, in many ways the 
core of this Article, makes the argument for turning away from 
public prosecutors and restoring prosecution to the people.  It 
also returns to the question that motivates this Article: what 
benefits might accrue if victims had the option to pursue crimi-
nal charges through private prosecution or public prosecution? 
Part III argues there would be several benefits, including de-
mocratizing criminal justice and, quite possibly, reducing mass 
incarceration. 
16 See, e.g., U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, GLOBAL STUDY ON HOMICIDE 12, 
126 (2013) (showing that the U.S. homicide rate is below the global average). 
17 ROY WALMSLEY, INST. FOR CRIMINAL POLICY RESEARCH, WORLD PRISON POPULA-
TION LIST 2 (12th ed. 2018). 
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I 
THE PROSECUTORS 
Consider two fairly recent news stories: one that is not so 
well known and one that has received national attention.  In 
May 2019, the New York Times began a story with the following 
lines: “Evidence so neglected it grew mold.  Calls to the authori-
ties for help that went unanswered.  Witnesses and victims who 
were never interviewed.”18  The story was in part about the 
failure of police and prosecutors to charge rape cases.  Indeed, 
in many respects that part of the story was familiar.  According 
to one recent study looking at rape reporting between 1995 and 
2012, roughly a million reported “forcible vaginal rapes of fe-
male victims nationwide disappeared from the official 
records”;19 police officers and prosecutors simply decided not 
to prosecute them.20  Instead, prosecutors culled and chose the 
few cases they wanted to pursue.  What was less familiar was 
the second part of the story: now, victims are trying to force 
action.  In various cities around the country, victims are actu-
ally suing to force police and district attorneys to investigate 
and prosecute.21 
The other story is better known and continues to receive 
coverage nationwide.  On July 7, 2019, a federal indictment 
was unsealed in the Southern District of New York charging 
financier Jeffrey Epstein with running a sex trafficking ring 
between 2002 and 2005.22  The ring involved enticing and 
18 Valeriya Safronova & Rebecca Halleck, These Rape Victims Had to Sue to 
Get the Police to Investigate, N.Y. TIMES (May 23, 2019), https://www.nytimes. 
com/2019/05/23/us/rape-victims-kits-police-departments.html [https:// 
perma.cc/8ZK2-Z7YK]. 
19 Corey Rayburn Yung, How to Lie with Rape Statistics: America’s Hidden 
Rape Crisis, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1197, 1198, 1204 (2014). 
20 As it stands now, prosecutors have full discretion in deciding which rape 
cases to pursue and what redress to seek.  As one scholar recently observed, this 
approach “concomitantly reifies state power and positions the state as the savior 
of women,” at least in the few cases the state does prosecute. See Erin Collins, 
The Criminalization of Title IX, 13 OHIO  ST. J. CRIM. L. 365, 371 (2016).  This 
discretion also results in prosecutors relying on non-legal factors in selecting 
cases to pursue, such as which victims look like “good girls,” a selection process 
that has class, race, and other status implications. See I. Bennett Capers, Real 
Women, Real Rape, 60 UCLA L. REV. 826, 854–65 (2013) [hereinafter Capers, Real 
Women, Real Rape]. 
21 Safronova & Halleck, supra note 18.  The cities in which women have filed 
lawsuits to force police and prosecutors to investigate and prosecute cases in-
clude Austin, San Francisco, Memphis, Houston, and Baltimore. Id. 
22 Ali Watkins & Vivian Wang, Jeffrey Epstein is Accused of Luring Girls to His 
Manhattan Mansion and Abusing Them, N.Y. TIMES (July 7, 2019), https:// 
www.nytimes.com/2019/07/07/nyregion/jeffrey-epstein-sex-trafficking.html 
[https://perma.cc/Z4LX-8MKE]. 
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recruiting girls as young as fourteen to visit his mansion in 
Manhattan and his estate in Palm Beach, Florida “to engage[ ] 
in [paid] sex acts with him.”23  The indictment also charged 
Epstein with paying his victims to recruit additional girls for 
abuse and with creating “a vast network of underage victims for 
him to sexually exploit.”24  A search of his mansion in Manhat-
tan conducted to coincide with his arrest revealed hundreds of 
sexually suggestive photographs of young girls who appear un-
derage.25  While this and Epstein’s subsequent suicide made 
the story newsworthy and gave it legs, the public and the news 
talk shows also expressed outrage over the “secret plea deal” 
Epstein received years earlier in a different case.  That case was 
based on similar evidence involving more than eighty victims;26 
however, those prosecutors gave Epstein a “sweetheart” plea 
deal.27  Under that earlier deal, prosecutors allowed Epstein to 
bypass a life sentence to instead serve just a year in a Palm 
Beach jail under terms that allowed him to leave the facility for 
twelve hours each day, six days a week, so that he could work 
from home.28  The prosecutors negotiated this plea in secret, 
without informing Epstein’s victims.29  The prosecutors also 
agreed to immunize Epstein’s unindicted co-conspirators.30 
23 Indictment at 3, United States v. Epstein, 425 F. Supp. 3d 306 (S.D.N.Y. 
2019) (No. 19–cr–490). 
24 Watkins & Wang, supra note 22. 
25 Ali Watkins, Jeffrey Epstein Is Indicted on Sex Charges as Discovery of 
Nude Photos Is Disclosed, N.Y. TIMES (July 8, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2019/07/08/nyregion/jeffrey-epstein-charges.html [https://perma.cc/8ZAN-
EFEK]. 
26 Julie K. Brown, Cops Worked to Put Serial Sex Abuser in Prison.  Prosecu-
tors Worked to Cut Him a Break, MIAMI  HERALD (Nov. 28, 2018), https:// 
www.miamiherald.com/news/local/article214210674.html [https://perma.cc/ 
K8PP-Q4DJ]; Watkins & Wang, supra note 22. 
27 See Watkins & Wang, supra note 22. 
28 To add insult to injury, prosecutors routinely prosecute minors on charges 
of prostitution while discounting the fact that they are also victims of statutory 
rape.  Cynthia Godsoe, Punishment as Protection, 52 HOUS. L. REV. 1313, 1323–32 
(2015). 
29 Despite victims having the right to have their views heard pursuant to the 
Crime Victims’ Rights Act of 2004, the prosecutors kept the plea negotiations and 
actual plea secret from victims until after the plea was entered.  Though a federal 
judge later ruled that the prosecutors violated CVRA, the judge stopped short of 
invalidating the plea. See Doe 1 v. United States, 359 F. Supp. 3d 1201, 1217–22 
(S.D. Fla. 2019); Julie K. Brown, Federal Prosecutors Broke Law in Jeffrey Epstein 
Case, Judge Rules, MIAMI  HERALD (Feb. 21, 2019, 2:51 PM), https:// 
www.miamiherald.com/news/state/florida/article226577419.html [https:// 
perma.cc/6XPR-L69Q]. 
30 Doe 1, 359 F. Supp. 3d at 1208.  It was not just Florida prosecutors who 
helped Epstein.  At Epstein’s request, the District Attorney for Manhattan made a 
motion to have Epstein’s sex registration status reduced to the lowest possible 
classification.  Jan Ransom, Cyrus Vance’s Office Sought Reduced Sex-Offender 
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These two stories—victims suing to have their cases inves-
tigated and prosecuted, and the sweetheart deal Epstein re-
ceived in Florida—are not just linked by the subject of sexual 
assault.  They are linked—and indeed, undergirded—by the 
unbridled power of prosecutors.  The power to charge or not 
charge.  The power to plead or not plead.  And this power is 
reflected in a range of cases.  It runs the gamut from a Chicago 
prosecutor’s decision to dismiss charges against the actor Jus-
sie Smollett notwithstanding overwhelming evidence,31 to the 
Department of Justice’s decision to forego charges against the 
police officer who caused the death of Eric Garner by holding 
him in an illegal chokehold while he protested that he was 
unable to breathe,32 to prosecutors’ failure to charge any exec-
utive in connection with the financial collapse of 2008.33 
Status for Epstein, N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/ 
07/09/nyregion/cyrus-vance-epstein.html [https://perma.cc/6MQ6-A6Z3]. 
Even though the Manhattan judge refused, in the end it did not matter.  When 
Epstein failed to comply with his registration, the Manhattan DA’s Office simply 
looked the other way.  Erin Donaghue, NYPD Says It Wasn’t Required to Monitor 
Jeffrey Epstein’s Sex Offender Registration, CBS NEWS (July 11, 2019, 8:26 PM), 
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/jeffrey-epstein-nypd-says-it-wasnt-required-
to-monitor-sex-offender-registration/ [https://perma.cc/D2ZQ-EWN2]. 
31 Julia Jacobs, Jussie Smollett Fights Appointment of Special Prosecutor, N.Y. 
TIMES (July 19, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/19/arts/television/ 
jussie-smollett-special-prosecutor.html [https://perma.cc/TH7F-NX2E]. This 
power is also reflected in the subsequent decision of a special prosecutor to 
pursue charges. See Julia Jacobs, Jussie Smollett Indicted Again in Attack That 
Police Called a Hoax, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 11, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2020/02/11/arts/television/jussie-smollett-indicted-chicago.html [https:// 
perma.cc/LQ6K-B8K2].  Indeed, one could even say that the Jussie Smollett case 
has become less about him than about prosecutorial power generally. See Paul 
Butler, Paul Butler: The Real Target of the Jussie Smollett Charges is a Progressive 
Prosecutor, CRIMESTORY (Feb. 17, 2020), https://crimestory.com/2020/02/17/ 
paul-butler-the-real-target-of-the-jussie-smollett-charges-is-a-progressive-prose-
cutor/ [https://perma.cc/T3EL-FJZ8]. 
32 Sharon Otterman, ‘The D.O.J. Has Failed Us’: Eric Garner’s Family Assails 
Prosecutors, N.Y. TIMES (July 16, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/16/ 
nyregion/eric-garner-justice-department-charges.html?searchResultPosition=1 
[https://perma.cc/VP96-LK5L]. 
33 See also Jerry W. Markham, Regulating the “Too Big to Jail” Financial 
Institutions, 83 BROOK. L. REV. 517, 518–19 (2018) (noting that only lower level 
officers and traders were prosecuted criminally, and that high level executives 
were given immunity from prosecution); Nick Werle, Note, Prosecuting Corporate 
Crime When Firms Are Too Big to Jail: Investigation, Deterrence, and Judicial 
Review, 128 YALE L.J. 1366, 1370 (2019) (arguing that deterrence principles do 
not function properly when firms are too big to jail); Jed S. Rakoff, The Financial 
Crisis: Why Have No High-Level Executives Been Prosecuted?, N.Y. REV. BOOKS 
(Jan. 9, 2014) https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2014/01/09/financial-crisis-
why-no-executive-prosecutions/?printpage=true [https://perma.cc/F43T-YU2X] 
(criticizing the Department of Justice’s rationales for not prosecuting executives). 
See generally BRANDON L. GARRETT, TOO BIG TO JAIL: HOW PROSECUTORS COMPROMISE 
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Nor are prosecutors universally declining to pursue 
charges or universally declining to enforce the laws vigorously, 
either of which could be categorized as under enforcement.  At 
the same time prosecutors use their power to decline to pursue 
some offenders, they also use their power to overcharge many 
others.  Some stories we know because they make the news or 
are from Supreme Court opinions.  The Alabama prosecutor 
who indicted a pregnant woman on manslaughter charges be-
cause she got in an altercation resulting in another woman 
shooting her in the stomach.34  The Connecticut prosecutor 
who indicted Tanya McDowell, a poor black woman, on larceny 
charges for enrolling her child in a better neighboring school 
district in which she did not live, resulting in a five-year sen-
tence.35  The California prosecutor who filed a three-strikes 
charge against Gary Ewing, resulting in a mandatory twenty-
five to life sentence for stealing three golf clubs worth less than 
$1200.36  These are the stories that make the news or make it 
to the Supreme Court.  But there are also routine, quotidian 
stories.  The thirteen million misdemeanor cases that prosecu-
tors file each year.37  The half a million prosecutions for mari-
juana possession.38  There is a reason John Pfaff, in his 
analysis of mass incarceration, concluded that much of the 
blame lies with prosecutors.39  The point is not just that we 
should be troubled by how prosecutors exercise their power in 
particular cases.  The point is that we should be troubled by 
how much power they have in the first place.  And we should be 
troubled by the fact that it tends to be the poor and the vulner-
able who get the short end of the stick. 
WITH CORPORATIONS 6 (2014) (noting the rise of deferred prosecution agreements 
instead of filing criminal cases against corporations). 
34 Sarah Mervosh, Alabama Woman Who Was Shot While Pregnant is Charged 
in Fetus’s Death, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/ 
06/27/us/pregnant-woman-shot-marshae-jones.html [https://perma.cc/D4ZL-
MPF5]. 
35 Admissions Scandal Revives Story of Mom Imprisoned for Son’s Out of Dis-
trict Schooling, VIBE (Mar. 15, 2019, 2:53 PM), https://www.vibe.com/2019/03/ 
tanya-mcdowell-school-prison [https://perma.cc/AEE2-T978]. 
36 Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 19–20 (2003). 
37 ALEXANDRA NATAPOFF, PUNISHMENT WITHOUT CRIME: HOW OUR MASSIVE MISDE-
MEANOR SYSTEM TRAPS THE INNOCENT AND MAKES AMERICA MORE UNEQUAL 2 (2018). 
38 Drug War Statistics, DRUG  POLICY ALLIANCE http://www.drugpolicy.org/is 
sues/drug-war-statistics [https://perma.cc/77JW-QUGD] (last visited July 26, 
2019). 
39 PFAFF, supra note 2, at 206. But see Jeffrey Bellin, Reassessing 
Prosecutorial Power Through the Lens of Mass Incarceration, 116 MICH. L. REV. 
835, 856 (2018) (concluding that “it is misleading and counterproductive to claim 
that [prosecutors], not legislators or judges,” are primarily responsible for mass 
incarceration). 
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After all, the prosecutor has the unfettered power to decide 
whether to charge an individual or not,40 as well as to decide 
which charges to bring.41  So much power that when the Court 
in McCleskey v. Kemp42 was confronted with gross racial dis-
parities in prosecutors’ decisions to seek the death penalty 
even after controlling for thirty-nine other variables, it claimed 
it was powerless to intercede.43  The prosecutor’s current con-
trol over the grand jury,44 and her ability to issue subpoenas,45 
is similarly staggering.  It is the prosecutor who decides 
whether to negotiate a plea or not, and what terms to offer.46  In 
many jurisdictions, the prosecutor in effect decides the sen-
tence.47  With “nearly-unfettered and nearly-unreviewable dis-
cretion, prosecutors determine almost every aspect of a 
defendant’s case.”48  In short, the prosecutor often functions as 
the “police, prosecutor, magistrate, grand jury, petit jury, and 
40 As Josh Bowers writes, prosecutors’ “prerogative to pursue easy legal cases 
is essentially plenary: They may, but need not, consider normative guilt; they 
may, but need not, exercise equitable discretion.”  Josh Bowers, Legal Guilt, Nor-
mative Innocence, and the Equitable Decision Not to Prosecute, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 
1655, 1659 (2010). 
41 DAVIS, supra note 1, at 126–27, 140–41.  One of the clearest examples of 
this discretion arose out of the riots at the Attica Correctional Facility in 1971.  As 
the guards were ostensibly taking steps to regain control of the prison, they 
retaliated by killing several prisoners and continued to assault and beat prisoners 
after regaining control.  When federal and state prosecutors declined to pursue 
charges against the guards, prisoners and family members sued.  The Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed the claims, citing the discretionary power of 
prosecutors. See Inmates of Attica Correctional Facility v. Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 
375, 382 (2d Cir. 1973).  For a historical perspective on this discretionary power, 
see Carolyn B. Ramsey, The Discretionary Power of “Public” Prosecutors in Histori-
cal Perspective, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1309, 1323–52 (2002). 
42 481 U.S. 279, 297 (1987) (citing prosecutorial discretion as a reason to not 
disturb conviction, notwithstanding evidence of racial disparities in prosecutors’ 
charging decisions). 
43 Id. at 308. 
44 Andrew D. Leipold, Why Grand Juries Do Not (and Cannot) Protect the 
Accused, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 260, 264 (1995) (concluding that the current system 
“ensures that even reasonable, independent-minded jurors will defer to the prose-
cutor’s judgment”); Note, Restoring Legitimacy: The Grand Jury as the Prosecutor’s 
Administrative Agency, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1205, 1208 (2017); see also Common-
wealth v. Walczak, 979 N.E.2d 732, 752 (Mass. 2012) (Lenk, J., concurring) (“It 
can fairly be said that the prosecutor holds all the cards before the grand jury.”). 
45 Miriam H. Baer, Law Enforcement’s Lochner, MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2021) (manuscript at 4–6, 30–31) (on file with author) (detailing rules that enable 
government prosecutors and regulators to collect an immense amount of informa-
tion relatively easily and quickly). 
46 Capers, The Prosecutor’s Turn, supra note 5, at 1290–95. 
47 SANFORD H. KADISH, STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, & RACHEL E. BARKOW, CRIMINAL 
LAW AND ITS PROCESSES: CASES AND MATERIALS 1180 (10th ed. 2017). 
48 John F. Pfaff, Criminal Punishment and the Politics of Place, 45 FORDHAM 
URB. L.J. 571, 575 (2018); see also Angela J. Davis, Meet the Criminal Justice 
System’s Most Powerful Actors, APPEAL (May 29, 2018), https://theappeal.org/ 
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judge in one.”49  “He is the pivotal figure in the justice pro-
cess.”50 Indeed, law itself “is qualified, and may even be nulli-
fied completely, by [a prosecutor’s] discretion.”51  And through 
charges and lobbying, prosecutors play a role in law making, 
enough to prompt Bill Stuntz to describe prosecutors as “the 
criminal justice system’s real lawmakers.”52  It is little wonder 
that Erik Luna and Marianne Wade have observed that, for all 
intents and purposes, “the prosecutor is the criminal justice 
system.”53  Or that a U.S. Attorney General acknowledged, 
“[t]he prosecutor has more control over life, liberty, and reputa-
tion than any other person in America.”54  After all, because of 
separation-of-powers requirements, courts are prohibited from 
compelling prosecutors to file charges.55  And yet society rarely 
questions this.56 
None of this is to suggest that judges, legislators, or the 
police play no role in the criminal justice system.  They do, 
meet-the-cj-systems-most-powerful-actors/ [https://perma.cc/3WAH-4GLT] 
(“The power and discretion of prosecutors cannot be overstated.”). 
49 RAYMOND MOLEY, POLITICS AND CRIMINAL PROSECUTION vii (1929). 
50 Jack M. Kress, Progress and Prosecution, 423 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. 
SCI. 99, 100 (1976). 
51 KADISH ET AL., supra note 47, at 1179; see also William J. Stuntz, The 
Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 506 (2001) (noting 
that prosecutors “frequently decline to arrest or charge”). 
52 Stuntz, supra note 51, at 506, 578; see also id. at 509 (“As criminal law 
expands, both lawmaking and adjudication pass into the hands of police and 
prosecutors; law enforcers, not the law, determine who goes to prison and for how 
long.”); Bowers, supra note 40, at 1659–60 (“Laws are shells, and prosecutors 
retain almost unfettered discretion to decide how to fill the void within.”). 
53 Erik Luna & Marianne Wade, Prosecutors as Judges, 67 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 1413, 1415 (2010). 
54 Robert H. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 31 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 3, 
3 (1940). 
55 See, e.g., State ex rel. Unnamed Petitioners v. Connors, 401 N.W.2d 782, 
791 (Wis. 1987) (holding that a state statute permitting courts to compel prosecu-
tion violated the separation-of-powers requirement of the constitution); cf. Steen 
v. Appellate Div. Superior Court, 331 P.3d 136, 141–42 (Cal. 2014) (similar). 
56 Nor can we simply dismiss this concentrated power with the consolation 
that prosecutors, the overwhelming majority of whom are elected, are acting as 
our representatives.  While this is nominally true, it is also true that many are also 
motivated by self-interest, including their future careers. See Capers, The Prose-
cutor’s Turn, supra note 5, at 1290–92; Bruce A. Green & Rebecca Roiphe, Re-
thinking Prosecutors’ Conflicts of Interest, 58 B.C. L. REV. 463, 472 (2017); Kay L. 
Levine & Ronald F. Wright, Prosecutor Risk, Maturation, and Wrongful Conviction 
Practice, 42 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 648, 657–58 (2017); see also Jed Shugerman, 
“The Rise of the Prosecutor Politicians”: Database of Prosecutorial Experience for 
Justices, Circuit Judges, Governors, AGs, and Senators, 1880–2017, SHUGERBLOG 
(July 7, 2017), https://shugerblog.com/2017/07/07/the-rise-of-the-prosecutor-
politicians-database-of-prosecutorial-experience-for-justices-circuit-judges-gover 
nors-ags-and-senators-1880-2017/ [https://perma.cc/DMN7-L5D7] (theorizing 
that prosecutors have historically used their position “as a stepping stone for 
higher office”). 
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especially the police.57  But their power pales in comparison to 
that of prosecutors.  While the police can make an arrest, in 
most jurisdictions it is the prosecutor who must seek charges. 
With respect to the power of judges, the federal judge Jed 
Rakoff has described prosecutors as “the real rulers of the 
American criminal justice system.”58  And the power of prose-
cutors has only grown, along with their numbers.  In 1974, 
there were approximately 17,000 state prosecutors nation-
wide.59  By 2001, that number had swollen to approximately 
27,000, with a budget of $4.68 billion.60  A little over a decade 
ago, Rachel Barkow described the prosecutor as a “levia-
than.”61  No word seems more apt. 
Thus far, I have argued that the stories of women suing to 
force prosecutors to prosecute, the plutocratic “justice” that 
Epstein initially received, and the other examples of under and 
over enforcement, are linked by the unreviewable and monopo-
listic power of prosecutors to say yea or nay.  But another link 
is the relative powerlessness of the victims and by extension all 
of us, especially those of us with the least power in society.  At 
the same time that prosecutors have amassed power, actual 
victims have lost power.  Consider that it is not uncommon for 
prosecutors to demand the incarceration of domestic violence 
victims for refusing to “cooperate” against their alleged abus-
ers.62  Or consider a death penalty case in Colorado where 
prosecutors blocked the victim’s family from telling jurors they 
oppose the death penalty.63 
Victims have lost power.  This is especially true of victims 
who are already disadvantaged because of gender, or race, or 
57 See generally Jeffrey Bellin, The Power of Prosecutors, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
171, 191–94 (2019) (discussing the power of the police to influence outcomes 
before the charging stage). 
58 Jed S. Rakoff, Why Prosecutors Rule the Criminal Justice System—And 
What Can Be Done About It, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1429, 1436 (2017). 
59 PATRICK F. HEALY, NATIONAL PROSECUTOR SURVEY (1977). 
60 CAROL J. DEFRANCES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 193441, PROSECUTORS IN 
STATE  COURTS, 2001, at 4 (2002), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ 
psc01.pdf [https://perma.cc/8P7E-SH6T]. 
61 Barkow, supra note 6, at 874. 
62 Leigh Goodmark, The Impact of Prosecutorial Misconduct, Overreach, and 
Misuse of Discretion on Gender Violence Victims, 123 DICK. L. REV. 627, 637–40 
(2019) [hereinafter Goodmark, Prosecutorial Misconduct] (discussing the practice 
of using material witness warrants and incarceration to force domestic violence 
victims to cooperate). 
63 See Andrew Cohen, When Victims Speak Up in Court—In Defense of the 
Criminals, ATLANTIC (Jan. 28, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/national/ 
archive/2014/01/when-victims-speak-up-in-court-in-defense-of-the-criminals/ 
283345/ [https://perma.cc/A4AZ-N2JY]. 
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class, or sexuality.64  And it is true of the public more generally. 
After all, nearly ninety-seven percent of all convictions are now 
the result of pleas, a number so staggering that the Court fi-
nally acknowledged that plea bargaining “is the criminal justice 
system.”65  The disappearing jury trial is itself an issue in 
terms of justice; and as a key source of public input into guilt 
or innocence, it also speaks to the public’s diminishing role in 
criminal justice.66  “We now have not only an administrative 
criminal justice system,” Ronald Wright and Marc Miller ob-
serve, “but one so dominant that trials take place in the 
shadow of guilty pleas.”67  The jury trial that Alexis de To-
queville famously celebrated as a key component of democracy 
and part of “the sovereignty of the people” has become the 
exception, not the rule.68  In its place stands the prosecutor. 
This accumulation of power by prosecutors and diminution in 
power by the people has been gradual—Stephanos Bibas’ term 
“legal drift”69 is appropriate here—and has been more than 300 
years in the making.  It has been so gradual that many of us 
have come to take it for granted and see it as natural.  It has 
even been said that we became “careless of the continual 
growth of power in the prosecuting attorney.”70  But things 
were not always this way.  We were not always so careless. 
Originally, we, the people, had more power.  The Part below 
recounts this neglected history. 
64 This is true in sexual assault cases. See, e.g., Capers, Real Women, Real 
Rape, supra note 20, at 865–71 (arguing that black women face stereotypes about 
their sexuality that weakens their protection under rape shield laws); Capers, 
Real Rape Too, supra note 9, at 1297–1301 (discussing the lack of enforcement 
against rape when the victim is male).  It is true in capital cases. See, e.g., Randall 
L. Kennedy, McCleskey v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment, and the Supreme 
Court, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1388, 1390 (1988) (examining the Court’s failure to 
protect black victims of murder); BRANDON L. GARRETT, END OF  ITS  ROPE: HOW 
KILLING THE DEATH PENALTY CAN REVIVE CRIMINAL JUSTICE 84, 192 (2017) (finding that 
the race of victim matters in the pursuit of the death penalty; Garrett calls this the 
“white lives matter” effect).  It is true too of black and brown victims of police 
violence. 
65 Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 144 (2012) (stating that plea bargaining “is 
not some adjunct to the criminal justice system; it is the criminal justice system”) 
(quoting Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 
YALE L.J. 1909, 1912 (1992)). 
66 See, e.g., John W. Keker, The Advent of the ‘Vanishing Trial’: Why Trials 
Matter, 29 CHAMPION 32, 32 (2005) (noting the statistical decline of trials). 
67 Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, Honesty and Opacity in Charge Bargains, 55 
STAN. L. REV. 1409, 1415 (2003). 
68 See 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 282–83 (Phillips Brad-
ley ed., Henry Reeve trans., 1945) (1835). 
69 STEPHANOS BIBAS, THE MACHINERY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 1 (2012). 
70 NAT’L  COMM’N ON  LAW  OBSERVANCE AND  ENF’T, REPORT ON  PROSECUTION 11 
(1931). 
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II 
WE, THE PEOPLE 
While the notion of a crime victim pursing criminal charges 
herself may seem “alien to modern America,”71 throughout co-
lonial America and in England private prosecution was the 
norm.  To be sure, there were Attorneys General that handled 
criminal matters, but for the most part their authority was 
limited to cases that directly affected the Crown.  For everyday 
criminal matters, power resided with the people.  This Part re-
counts this rarely discussed history and then suggests three 
lessons that can be gleaned from it.  The goal is not to pay 
obeisance or offer blind fealty to our forebears by suggesting we 
adopt whole cloth their system of private prosecution.  Far from 
it.72  Nor is the point merely to show that private prosecution is 
part of our collective cultural DNA.  Rather, the point is to show 
that the public prosecutor, a “historical latecomer,”73 is not 
inevitable.  The point too is to show that the turn to public 
prosecutors has had very real consequences in terms of the 
expansion of criminal law and the contraction of the role of 
victims. 
A. From Private Prosecution to Public Prosecutors 
Today, the fact that public prosecutors bring cases in the 
name of the “people” is for the most part taken for granted.74 
71 JOAN E. JACOBY, THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR: A SEARCH FOR IDENTITY 10 (1980). 
72 Nor is the goal to idealize or romanticize the past, especially given evidence 
that the private prosecution system became very imperfect in some places.  One 
such place was Philadelphia.  As Allen Steinberg has documented, by the mid-
nineteenth century the private prosecution system in Philadelphia was “subject to 
exploitation, and often, relative to the formal law, quite corrupt.” ALLEN STEINBERG, 
THE  TRANSFORMATION OF  CRIMINAL  JUSTICE: PHILADELPHIA, 1800–1880 2 (1989). 
Steinberg acknowledges that this was attributable, at least in part, to the unique 
conditions of Philadelphia at the time: 
The spatial and social density of life in Philadelphia produced the 
circumstances in which ordinary people came to depend—and 
prey—upon one another.  All facets of popular life in Philadelphia 
created the propensity toward litigation: poverty, the stress of bewil-
dering social change, family tensions, ethnic and racial prejudice 
and rivalry, the boisterousness of the streets and saloons—in short, 
the everyday affairs of ordinary people living in crowded conditions 
in, or on the edge of, poverty.  The resolution of their quarrels and 
spats, and their attempts to take advantage of one another or to 
avenge injustices, took them regularly to court. 
Id. at 16–17. 
73 John H. Langbein, The Origins of Public Prosecution at Common Law, 17 
AM. J.  LEGAL HIST. 313, 313 (1973). 
74 Cf. Jocelyn Simonson, The Place of “The People” in Criminal Procedure, 119 
COLUM. L. REV. 249, 250–55 (2019) (exploring and challenging the assumption 
that prosecutors represent the people). 
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But things were not always this way.  It is not even part of our 
long common law history.75  From the point of view of our fore-
bears, it is the idea of public prosecutors having a monopoly 
over—or indeed, any role at all in—everyday criminal matters 
that would seem alien.76  As historian Joan Jacoby succinctly 
put it, there was “no figure like the prosecutor at Jamestown or 
Plymouth.”77  Rather, private prosecution was the norm, and 
ingrained in the common law. 
In common law . . . a crime [was] viewed not as an act against 
the state, but rather as a wrong inflicted upon a victim.  The 
aggrieved victim, or an interested friend or relative, would 
personally arrest and prosecute the offender, after which the 
courts would adjudicate the matter much as they would a 
contract dispute or a tortuous injury.78 
Put differently, prosecution of criminal offenses “consisted 
of charges being brought to the attention of the courts by indi-
viduals who had been wronged and who sought redress.”79  In 
small, sparsely populated areas, justice existed without a 
trained bar.  In larger areas that could support a professional 
judiciary, the model was still that of the rural justice-of-the-
75 See, e.g., JACOBY, supra note 71, at 6–7.  (“The public prosecutor is not part 
of America’s heritage from British common law.”  Rather, the “prosecuting attor-
ney is a distinctly American figure, and for distinctly American reasons.”); see also 
JOHN H. LANGBEIN, THE ORIGINS OF ADVERSARY CRIMINAL TRIAL 10–13 (2003) (describ-
ing the English practice, common through the sixteenth and seventeenth centu-
ries, of public prosecutors handling treason cases only; otherwise, victims of 
crimes served as their own prosecutors).  Evidence suggests the average trial 
lasted fifteen to twenty minutes. Id. at 16.  Later, the Marian Committal Statute 
would employ justices of the peace to play a more active role in private prosecu-
tions by in effect issuing arrest warrants, compelling witnesses to appear, and in 
some occasions assisting in the investigation by examining the prisoner and other 
witnesses. Id. at 40–41.  That said, even as recently as 1960, public prosecutions 
accounted for only eight percent of the prosecutions in England, with the remain-
ing prosecutions being brought by private individuals or the police, who under law 
are acting as private citizens “interested in the maintenance of law and order.” 
JACOBY, supra note 71, at 8. 
76 John Langbein makes a similar observation.  “We seldom appreciate,” 
writes Langbein, “that [our] lawyerized criminal trial looks as striking from the 
perspective of our own legal history as from that of comparative law.”  John H. 
Langbein, The Criminal Trial Before The Lawyers, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 263 
(1978). 
77 JACOBY, supra note 71, at 6. 
78 JACOBY, supra note 71, at 6–8 (“[T]he British common law system for prose-
cution was essentially litigation between private parties.”); Albert J. Reiss, Jr., 
Public Prosecutors and Criminal Prosecution in the United States of America, 20 
JURID. REV. 1, 4 (1975) (“Historically in England, while the Attorney-General, as 
Law Officer of the Crown, was responsible for criminal prosecutions in which the 
Crown was directly interested, the enforcement of criminal law was left almost 
entirely to private individuals.”). 
79 JACOBY, supra note 71, at 12–13. 
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peace system then predominant in England.  Either way, crimi-
nal justice in colonial America tended to be “the business of 
laymen, not lawyers.”80  Indeed, at common law a citizen could 
appeal directly to a grand jury to press charges.81  The criminal 
justice system in the Bay Colony of Massachusetts was not 
atypical.82  There, criminal justice was a decidedly private mat-
ter, with “simple courts [that] required no officer to represent 
the government or to bring prosecution.  The court itself repre-
sented the government; individuals brought charges against 
law breakers.”83  This is not to say that the public prosecutor 
was completely absent in the colonies.  In fact, the colonies had 
the equivalent of attorneys general.  However, their function, as 
in England,84 was limited to prosecuting matters that were of 
particular interest to the Crown—in England, think the trial of 
Sir Walter Raleigh; in the colonies, think the trial of British 
soldiers for firing on colonists during the Boston Massacre.85 
For everyday matters, “crime” was handled through private ac-
tors, the aggrieved against the alleged offender.86  For this rea-
son, historians have concluded that the public prosecutor, 
80 Stephanos Bibas, Transparency and Participation in Criminal Procedure, 81 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 911, 912 (2006); LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN 
AMERICAN HISTORY 27 (1993) (“Colonial justice was a business of amateurs.”). 
81 See 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., 3 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 8.4(b) (4th ed. 2015). 
82 JACOBY, supra note 71, at 13. 
83 Id.  It also speaks volumes that the primary summary of colonial trials, 
Criminal Trials in the Court of Assistants and Superior Court of Judicature, 
1630–1700, contains no reference to prosecuting attorneys. See JOHN  NOBLE, 
CRIMINAL TRIALS IN THE COURT OF ASSISTANTS AND SUPERIOUR COURT OF JUDICATURE, 
1630–1700 (1897). 
84 Yue Ma, Exploring the Origins of Public Prosecution, 18 INT’L CRIM. JUST. REV. 
190, 195 (2008) (“Apart from his duty in civil courts, the [Crown’s] attorney gen-
eral reviewed cases of crime to see if a royal interest was implicated.”).  Early 
English law distinguished between State trials, which involved matters of impor-
tance to the crown, and ordinary criminal cases.  While lawyers were involved in 
the former—Sir Walter Raleigh’s Case being a prime example—lawyers were typi-
cally not involved in the prosecution or defense of the latter. See Langbein, supra 
note 73, at 316. 
85 In addition to having prosecutorial authority over matters that directly 
affected the Crown, Attorneys General also had the power of nolle prosequi to 
dismiss privately brought prosecutions.  Robert L. Misner, Recasting Prosecutorial 
Discretion, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 717, 728 n.65 (1996). 
86 See DAVIS, supra note 1, at 9 (“Before the American Revolution, the crime 
victim maintained sole responsibility for apprehending and prosecuting the crimi-
nal suspect.”); Roger A. Fairfax Jr., Delegation of the Criminal Prosecution Function 
to Private Actors, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 411, 421 (2009) (“Although prosecutorial 
power in the early colonies initially often was concentrated in a representative of 
the Crown, the English tradition of private prosecution dominated the early Amer-
ican experience before the Revolution.”). 
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“virtually unknown to the English system,”87 was “an historical 
latecomer”88 to the American colonies. 
There was one notable exception to this norm of private 
prosecution, but this exception is traceable not to the English 
but to the Dutch, who controlled New York and much of the 
surrounding area as New Netherland from 1624 until 1673.89 
In 1653, the Dutch established the area’s first courts in Man-
hattan, then known as New Amsterdam, and then in Elizabeth, 
New Jersey, then called Bergen, in 1661.90  The Dutch system 
included a schout, “a combination constable and court officer,” 
whose duties included “presenting the case against the defen-
dant and notifying all accused of the charges being levelled 
against them.”91  “Citizens with complaints would go to the 
schout, provide him with statements and available evidence; he 
would notify the accused and make the presentation before the 
court.”92  When the English wrested control from the Dutch in 
1674 and New Amsterdam was rechristened New York, the 
English kept intact the responsibilities of the schout, though 
those responsibilities were now assigned to the sheriff.93  In-
deed, as late as 1676 magistrates in English-controlled New 
York were being instructed to administer justice according to 
“former practice, not repugnant to the laws of the govern-
ment.”94  When questioned about the propriety of maintaining 
87 Kress, supra note 50, at 100.  By the 17th century, criminal proceedings 
were undertaken under the name of the King, but largely administered by victims 
themselves.  As Marie Manikis puts it, victims “remained in charge of arrests, 
collecting evidence, and prosecutions.”  Marie Manikis, Conceptualizing the Victim 
Within Criminal Justice Processes in Common Law Tradition, in THE OXFORD HAND-
BOOK OF CRIMINAL PROCESS 247, 248 (Darryl K. Brown et al. eds., 2019). 
88 Langbein, supra note 73, at 313. 
89 Most legal historians trace the American form of prosecution to the Dutch. 
JACOBY, supra note 71, at 13–14; see also SANFORD H. KADISH & MONRAD G. PAUL-
SEN, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS  PROCESSES: CASES AND MATERIALS,  1034 (2d ed. 1969) 
(observing that the public prosecutor “is possibly a legacy from the Dutch admin-
istration in what is now New York”); Reiss, supra note 78, at 5 (identifying the 
schout as the likely origin for American prosecutors).  Other influences include the 
English Attorney General and the French procureur. See Reiss, supra note 78, at 
1–21; JACOBY, supra note 71, at 3.  There is also the possibility that the colonists 
recalled the hybrid role English Justices of the Peace assumed in the narrow class 
of serious felonies. See generally Langbein, supra note 73, at 313–25 (discussing 
this historical development).  The end result was a “uniquely American prosecu-
tor.”  Joan E. Jacoby, The American Prosecutor in Historical Context, 39 PROSECU-
TOR 34, 37 (2005). 
90 JACOBY, supra note 71, at 14. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. 
93 Reiss, supra note 78, at 6–7. 
94 Instructions for the Commissaries of Albany, Albany Ordinary Ct. 1676, 
quoted in 2 WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE COMMON LAW IN COLONIAL AMERICA 32 (2013). 
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public prosecutions, essentially a “foreign” practice now being 
exercised by the sheriff, the English colony responded by offi-
cially affirming the practice and issuing a written statement to 
that effect.95 
Even beyond the former Dutch possessions,96 small 
changes were happening elsewhere that set the stage for public 
prosecution.  By 1666, the Attorney General for Maryland was 
presenting criminal indictments to the grand jury.97  And by 
1670, the Attorney General for Virginia was appearing in the 
Court of Oyer and Terminer98 during all trials.99  Still, even as 
public prosecutors entered the scene—a period that some 
might call part of the “publicization of the private”100—their 
power was understood to be limited.  In “the eyes of the earliest 
Americans, [the public prosecutor was] clearly a minor actor in 
the court’s structure.”101  There was nothing approaching true 
public prosecution until 1704, when Connecticut—which had 
been partly under Dutch control—became the first colony to 
abolish all private prosecutions and adopt in its place a system 
of public prosecution.102  The Connecticut law provided: 
Henceforth there shall be in every countie a sober, discreet 
and religious person appointed by the countie courts, to be 
atturney for the Queen . . . to prosecute and implead in the 
lawe all criminals and to doe all other things necessary or 
convenient as an atturney to suppresse vice and 
immoralitie.103 
95 W. Scott Van Alstyne, Jr., Comment, The District Attorney—A Historical 
Puzzle, 1952 WIS. L. REV. 125, 137 (1952). 
96 There is some evidence to suggest that the Dutch influence of using a 
schout also extended to other Dutch possessions, including Delaware and Penn-
sylvania. JACOBY, supra note 71, at 14–15; see also Kress, supra note 50, at 104 
(discussing Dutch influence despite a small Dutch settler population). 
97 JACOBY, supra note 71, at 15.  New Hampshire followed suit in 1683. Id. 
98 Courts of Oyer and Terminer were essentially courts of general jurisdiction 
hearing and determining criminal cases. See Melissa J. Mauck, Court of Oyer and 
Terminer, in THE SOCIAL HISTORY OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA: AN ENCYCLO-
PEDIA 360 (Wilbur R. Miller ed., 2012). 
99 JACOBY, supra note 71, at 15. 
100 JOHN BRAITHWAITE, REGULATORY CAPITALISM: HOW IT WORKS, IDEAS FOR MAKING 
IT WORK BETTER 7–8 (2008); see also Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms 
Through Privatization, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1285, 1285 n.1 (2003) (discussing the 
opposite theory of “privatization”). 
101 JACOBY, supra note 71, at 23. 
102 Id. at 10. 
103 NAT’L  COMM’N ON  LAW  OBSERVANCE AND  ENF’T, REPORT ON  PROSECUTION  7 
(1931). 
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Gradually, other colonies followed suit,104 though evidence 
makes clear that public and private prosecution continued to 
co-exist well into the American Revolution and the ratification 
of the Constitution.105  But public prosecution was clearly in 
the ascendance, such that by the time of the Civil War, private 
prosecution was becoming a memory.106  Equally significant 
changes were happening federally.  Most notably, the federal 
government established the Office of a United States Attorney 
General and U.S. Attorneys through the Judiciary Act of 
1789.107  Private prosecution was receding and public prosecu-
tion was becoming the norm, though a few remnants of the old 
system remain even now.108  And public prosecutors, who went 
104 As Joan Jacoby has observed, the “most apt description of the process that 
has occurred in American criminal prosecution over the past 350 years is ‘evolu-
tion.’” JACOBY, supra note 71, at 6.  Unfortunately, until fairly recently, little had 
been written about the origin or history of public prosecutors.  What can be safely 
said is this: 
[T]hat there was no figure like the prosecutor at Jamestown or Plym-
outh; that by the time of the Revolution an officer with some of his 
basic characteristics had appeared in various colonies; that by the 
civil war, there were District Attorneys quite like those we have in 
the present era functioning in a large number of the states; and 
that, at the present time, most states employ a single, locally elected 
officer with primary responsibility and discretion to prosecute all 
criminal matters within a defined political subdivision. 
Id. 
105 For example, the legal historian George Thomas, in his examination of 
records from the New Jersey Court of Oyer and Terminer from 1749 to 1762, 
found citizens routinely “acted as prosecutor by bringing criminal prosecutions 
for most crimes. . . . [C]harges could be, and often were, laid by private citizens.” 
George C. Thomas III, Colonial Criminal Law and Procedure: The Royal Colony of 
New Jersey 1749–57, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 671, 679 (2005). 
106 See Allen Steinberg, From Private Prosecution to Plea Bargaining: Criminal 
Prosecution, the District Attorney, and American Legal History, 30 CRIME & DELINQ. 
568, 569–70 (1984). 
107 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 35, 1 Stat 73, 92–93.  This is not to suggest 
that, by the turn of the nineteenth century, public prosecution looked like prose-
cution as we know it today.  For example, it is telling that “early Congresses 
limited themselves to targeting activity that injured or interfered with the federal 
government itself, its property, or its programs.” DANIEL C. RICHMAN ET AL., DEFIN-
ING FEDERAL CRIMES 3 (2d ed., 2018). 
108 For example, in rape cases especially, it remains not uncommon for the 
victim to be described as the “prosecutrix”—see, e.g., Stephens v. Morris, 756 F. 
Supp. 1137, 1139 (N.D. Ind. 1991); State v. Rodriguez, 2012 WL 5358856, *1 (Del. 
Super. Ct. 2012); Rusk v. State, 406 A.2d 624, 625 (1979); People v. Abbot, 19 
Wend. (N.Y.) 192, 192 (1838); —a likely a carryover from the period when victims 
prosecuted their own cases.  Similarly, it is not infrequent for law enforcement to 
ask a victim if he or she wants to “press charges.”  While this likely originally 
meant prosecute the case, now the term is simply used to see if the victim is 
willing to testify and/or is sufficiently invested in the outcome to want the officer 
to pursue charges.  In many respects, the question is asked as a courtesy.  In 
addition, citizens still have the right to play a role in prosecution in a handful of 
jurisdictions. See, e.g., Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Professionals, Politicos, and 
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from being appointed to being elected,109 were on the road to 
exercising the hegemonic power they wield today.110 
There still remains the question of what prompted this 
transition from private prosecutions to public prosecutions. 
Although the historical record is thin111—unsurprising, given 
that until recently, little had “been written about [the history of] 
the prosecutor; scant research [was] conducted”112—it seems 
safe to assume that contributing factors include the rise in 
urbanization that accompanied the industrial revolution, to-
gether with the growing complexity of the law.113  Britain’s 
dwindling influence in local matters, largely as a result of geog-
raphy and the colonists’ preference for self-rule, likely played a 
role as well; this would have allowed the colonies to experiment 
with and embrace public prosecutors at a time when the Brit-
ish system was still predicated on private prosecution.114  It is 
also possible that colonists viewed public prosecutors as a way 
to relieve victims of the need to pursue their own cases115 or to 
level the playing field between victims with means to pursue 
private prosecutions, and victims without.  In addition, public 
prosecutors may have been viewed as a buffer against vindic-
tive or unscrupulous complainants, or even biased grand ju-
rors.  As such, it is entirely possible that colonists viewed the 
transition to public prosecutions as a net good.  Joan Jacoby 
suggests that “[t]he office of the prosecutor is the natural and 
logical result of the legal, social, and political developments 
that shaped the United States’ judicial system over the past 
Crony Attorneys General: A Historical Sketch of the U.S. Attorney General as a 
Case for Structural Independence, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 1965, 1987 (2019) (“Even 
today, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Virginia, and 
Texas allow private citizens to serve a role in criminal prosecutions.”). 
109 For a discussion of this change, see JACOBY, supra note 71, at 19–28. 
110 To be sure, the victims’ rights movement of the last few decades has re-
sulted in victims normally having a right to make their views known.  However, for 
the most part this has resulted in a right of consultation and expression, such as 
the right to submit victim impact statements.  It has not resulted in dispositive 
participation. See Manikis, supra note 87, at 257–60. 
111 Jacoby herself concedes that it “is impossible to say exactly why the system 
of private prosecution failed to root in the American colonies.” JACOBY, supra note 
71, at 16; see also FRIEDMAN, supra note 80, at 21 (describing the colonial criminal 
justice system as “elusive.  The further we look back in time, the dimmer the world 
gets, and the stranger.”); Langbein, supra note 76, at 263–64 (lamenting that the 
history “could be so little glimpsed from the conventional sources”). 
112 JACOBY, supra note 71, at xv. 
113 Id. at 16–19. 
114 Id. at 11–12, 16–18. 
115 She adds, “[t]he rejection of the general notion of a privileged class within 
society also resulted in the rejection of ideas and forms that tended to protect that 
privilege.  In colonial America, public prosecution was an available and progres-
sive remedy for a population dedicated to a more democratic society.” Id at 17. 
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350 years.  [The result] is a distinctly American figure, and for 
distinctly American reasons.”116  Lawrence Friedman is even 
more direct, arguing that “the concept of public responsibility 
for prosecuting criminals rang a bell in the colonial mind.”117 
While these explanations have an intuitive appeal, they 
may obscure less generous reasons colonies had for embracing 
public prosecutions.  Criminologist Nils Christie’s observations 
bear repeating: “Authorities have in time past shown consider-
able willingness, in representing the victim, to act as receivers 
of the money or other property from the offender.”118  It is also 
worth observing that the rise in public prosecutors, at least in 
Virginia, may have had something to do with making sure 
money went into its coffers; one problem with private prosecu-
tions was that it made it easy for parties to bypass paying fees 
to the court system.119  The legal historian Nicholas Parrillo 
goes even further, noting that throughout much of the nine-
teenth century, “American public prosecutors made their in-
come from fees, usually based on the number of cases they 
brought or the number of convictions they won.”120  Stephanos 
Bibas is specific: “Until the mid-nineteenth century, New York 
prosecutors searched for evidence, drafted legal documents, 
and empanelled juries upon victims’ paying them set fees.”121 
All of this suggests that the colonies’ turn to public prosecution 
may have been anything but disinterested. 
Indeed, it is worth noting that even today, states may have 
an incentive to maintain control over prosecutions.  Just one 
data point: victims rarely receive restitution from defendants, 
even when the defendants have the financial wherewithal to 
make restitution.  Instead of restitution to victims, we have 
moved to a system in which defendants are instead required to 
make payments to courts and indirectly to prosecutors, 
through court fees.  Although in some places, courts require 
that restitution take precedence over any fines or fees, other 
116 Id. at 6.  She adds “[t]he system [of private prosecutions] failed to hold 
because it fit poorly with the concept that the new Americans had developed for 
their government.” Id. at 10. 
117 FRIEDMAN, supra note 80, at 30. 
118 Nils Christie, Conflicts as Property, 17 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 1, 4 (1977). 
119 As Joan Jacoby notes, this practice threatened “the financial solvency of 
the courts.”  This concern was weighty enough such that in 1711, Virginia’s 
Attorney General ordered his deputies to involve themselves in all prosecutions to 
ensure the state collected revenue from prosecutions. JACOBY, supra note 71, at 
18. 
120 NICHOLAS R. PARRILLO, AGAINST THE PROFIT MOTIVE: THE SALARY REVOLUTION IN 
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, 1780–1940, at 255 (2013). 
121 BIBAS, supra note 69, at 4. 
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jurisdictions give no such priority.  Furthermore, given that the 
vast majority of indicted defendants are themselves poor, the 
requirement that they pay court fees and fines likely means 
defendants have less money at their disposal to make victims 
whole.122 
Although it is important to grasp why our norm of private 
prosecutions disappeared—tellingly, the history is all but ab-
sent from criminal law casebooks123—the larger issue is that 
such a norm existed.  What lessons can we take from this his-
tory?  I submit there are three, which I describe below. 
B. Three Lessons 
It would be easy to view the history of private prosecutions, 
and subsequent turn to public prosecutions, as merely that: 
history.  Dusty history.  An interesting side note, or endnote, or 
footnote, but nothing more.  While such a view is tempting, it 
would not be correct.  In fact, understanding this history leads 
to three important insights, all of which thicken our under-
standing of the criminal justice system we have now. 
First, this history reveals how contingent prosecutors are. 
We have become so inured to a system dependent on “insiders 
who run the criminal justice system—judges, police, and espe-
cially prosecutors”124—that we tend to think of it as natural, as 
just how things are.  Knowing that the “very institution of pub-
lic prosecution is largely an American invention”125 denatural-
izes the current system.  And it shows that other ways are 
possible.  Indeed, it reveals that a completely different way of 
doing things—private prosecutions—is in our collective cul-
tural DNA. 
Second, this history prompts us to consider how the state 
came to supplant the role of crime victims.  Because this is 
what happened as public prosecutors became the norm.  Just 
122 Putting a number on how much victims lose as a result of court fees and 
fines is difficult to assess, in part because there is so little data, let alone uniform 
data, on collection.  It is also complicated by varying rules about what restitution 
means or who is a victim.  For example, New York, in a bit of legislative legerde-
main, requires all convicted defendants to pay a “victim” fee, regardless of whether 
the crime was victimless or not. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 60.35(1)(a) (Consol. 2020) 
(requiring all persons convicted of a felony or misdemeanor to pay a “crime victim 
assistance fee of twenty-five dollars”). 
123 See, e.g., KADISH ET AL., supra note 47, at 1191–92 (discussing the availabil-
ity of private prosecutions in Britain and other countries but omitting the history 
of private prosecutions in the United States). 
124 Bibas, supra note 80, at 911. 
125 FRANK W. MILLER, PROSECUTION: THE DECISION TO CHARGE A  SUSPECT WITH A 
CRIME 54 n.22 (1969). 
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consider.  As early as 1777, the Pennsylvania Constitution de-
clared that “all prosecutions shall commence in the name and 
by the authority” of Pennsylvania, and that all charged crimes 
violate the essential “peace and dignity of the same.”126  Al-
though this language did not explicitly exclude actual victims, 
the sentiment clearly did, such that the concept of criminal 
justice soon conceived “of the criminal act to be a public occur-
rence and of society as a whole the ultimate victim.”127  A judge 
of the Court of Pleas, New Haven County, Connecticut, ob-
served as much in his 1926 article, The Office of Prosecutor in 
Connecticut: 
In all criminal cases in Connecticut “the state” is the 
prosecutor.  The offenses are aginst [sic] “the state.” The vic-
tim of the offense is not a “party” to the prosecution nor does 
he occupy any relation to it other than that of a “witness,” an 
interested witness mayhap, but none the less only a witness. 
It is not necessary that the injured party make com-
plaint . . . . He cannot in any way control the prosecution and 
whether reluctant or no, he can be compelled like any other 
witness to appear and testify.128 
Just a few years later in Berger v. United States, the United 
States Supreme Court used similar language to describe fed-
eral prosecutors: “The United States Attorney is the represen-
tative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a 
sovereignty . . . .”129  Not only was the victim’s role supplanted, 
the victim was, in effect, rendered superfluous.  If anything, 
courts now frown upon victims seeking criminal recourse.  To 
be sure, a handful of states today allow the use of private 
prosecutors, but their use is limited and restricted to a narrow 
range of cases.130  What is more common is for states to en-
tirely bar private prosecutions.131  A decision from the Wiscon-
126 PA. CONST. OF 1776 ch. 2, §§ 21, 27.  The following year, Vermont added 
similar language to its constitution. See VT. CONST. OF 1777, ch.2, art. XXIV. 
127 JACOBY, supra note 71, at 10. 
128 Walter M. Pickett, The Office of Prosecutor in Connecticut, 17 J. AM. INST. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 348, 356–57 (1926).  Although this quote is often attrib-
uted to Malley v. Lane, 115 A. 674 (Conn. 1921), it is actually by the Honorable 
Walter Pickett, a Connecticut state judge. Id. 
129 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). 
130 The role of private attorneys is usually confined to assisting a public prose-
cutor and requires the consent of both the public prosecutor and the court. See 
Reiss, supra note 78, at 1. 
131 See, e.g., People v. Mun. Court, 103 Cal. Rptr. 645, 653–54 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1972) (ruling that a private prosecution was inconsistent with California’s consti-
tution and a statute which required district attorney’s approval for all prosecu-
tions); In re Richland Cty. Magistrate’s Court, 699 S.E.2d 161, 163 (S.C. 2010) 
(ruling that private prosecutions are inconsistent with the state’s constitution, 
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sin Supreme Court speaks volumes.  It not only reversed a 
conviction secured with the aid of private counsel; it also pro-
claimed that the use of private counsel to assist in prosecu-
tions is contrary to the state’s “public policy.”132 
The end result is that, contrary to popular understanding, 
a victim is not a “party” to a criminal prosecution.  Nor, absent 
unusual circumstances, does the crime victim have an attor-
ney in court.133  Jack Kress’s observations in this regard bear 
repeating: 
The American district attorney . . . represents the state and 
not the victim.  This is why he rarely consults a victim with 
regard to charging or plea negotiations and almost never in-
forms him of the results of the case in which the victim may 
have been injured or robbed.  When the crime victim speaks 
of the assistant district attorney as being his attorney, he is 
spouting the myth of an adversary process and not the reali-
ties of a situation where he may never be informed of his 
rights to receive compensation or to refuse to testify.134 
Though this may seem a matter of little consequence— 
after all, this is the system we have come to take for granted, 
and the movement for crime victims’ rights has given victims 
some role—this shift to public prosecutors as a monopoly 
should give us pause.  It means that victims have less agency, if 
any at all.  It certainly seems to fall short of political philoso-
pher Jean Hampton’s notion that retributive punishment is a 
way for the victim to show her value and worth.135  Though it 
statutes, and case law, which “place the unfettered discretion to prosecute solely 
in the prosecutor’s hands”). 
132 State v. Peterson, 218 N.W. 367, 369 (Wis. 1928) (holding that a prosecu-
tion aided by private funds given by parties interested in the outcome invalidated 
the conviction).  In Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton, the United States Su-
preme Court reached a similar conclusion and imposed a “categorical rule against 
the appointment of an interested prosecutor.”  Young v. United States ex rel. 
Vuitton, 481 U.S. 787, 814 (1987).  Although Vuitton could be read as announcing 
a constitutional rule, a closer reading makes clear the decision was predicated on 
ethical and statutory rules and the Court’s supervisory authority, rather than 
grounded on a constitutional mandate.  There is also Robertson v. United States ex 
rel. Watson, 560 U.S. 272 (2010)—a case involving a private criminal contempt 
action following a public prosecution—in which the Court dismissed the writ of 
certiorari as improvidently granted.  In his dissent from the dismissal, Chief Jus-
tice Roberts took issue with the “threshold issue” that there can a private criminal 
action, but failed to articulate a constitutional basis for his rejection. Id. at 273. 
133 Kress, supra note 50, at 107 (“In the American system of criminal justice, 
the crime victim does not have an attorney in court.”). 
134 Id. 
135 See Jean Hampton, Correcting Harms Versus Righting Wrongs: The Goal of 
Retribution, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1659, 1679–85 (1992); see also JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & 
JEAN HAMPTON, FORGIVENESS AND MERCY 124–28 (1988) (“I am proposing that retrib-
utive punishment is the defeat of the wrongdoer at the hands of the victim (either 
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may seem as if I am going “far to seek disquietude,”136 ponder 
for a moment what work public prosecution as a monopoly 
actually does.  Ponder to what extent it functions as a type of 
erasure of the victim, or even as a revictimization.  Perhaps no 
one has interrogated this process more eloquently than Nils 
Christie.  In his oft-cited article Conflict as Property, Christie 
observes: 
The key element in a criminal proceeding is that the proceed-
ing is converted from something between the concrete parties 
into a conflict between one of the parties and the state.  So, in 
a modern criminal trial, two important things have hap-
pened.  First, the parties are being represented.  Secondly, 
the one party that is represented by the state, namely the 
victim, is so thoroughly represented that she or he for most of 
the proceedings is pushed completely out of the arena, re-
duced to the triggerer-off of the whole thing.  She or he is a 
sort of double loser; first, vis-à-vis the offender, but secondly 
and often in a more crippling manner by being denied rights 
to full participation in what might have been one of the more 
important ritual encounters in life.  The victim has lost the 
case to the state.137 
Indeed, if the right to pursue cases is something that belongs to 
us, something we have a property interest in, then public pros-
ecution as a monopoly is akin to a taking of that right.138 
Third, this history reveals how easily we have been lulled 
into thinking of prosecution, once a means to redress wrongs to 
real victims, as a means to redress wrongs to the state.  Put 
differently, the turn to public prosecution allowed the state not 
only to usurp the role of crime victims; it also enabled the state 
to create new crimes—and prop up old ones—in which the 
state could claim the role of the victim.  Instead of the difficulty 
of wondering who the victim was if an interracial couple wanted 
to marry, for example, the state could now rely on the notion 
that the state itself was the victim.  Ditto for two men having 
consensual sex.139  Ditto for someone walking at night “with no 
directly or indirectly through an agent of the victim’s, e.g., the state) that symbol-
izes the correct relative value of wrongdoer and victim.”). 
136 5 WILLIAM  WORDSWORTH, THE  PRELUDE OR, GROWTH OF A  POET’S  MIND: AN 
AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL POEM 65 (1850). 
137 Christie, supra note 118, at 3. 
138 See id. at 1–4. 
139 This is not to suggest that there were not early laws against interracial 
marriage or same-sex sex.  It is to suggest an explanation for the paucity of 
prosecutions prior to the creation of public prosecutors. Cf. Lawrence v. Texas, 
539 U.S. 558, 569 (2003) (noting that early laws prohibiting sodomy “do not seem 
to have been enforced against consenting adults acting in private”); Robert A. 
Pratt, Crossing the Color Line: A Historical Assessment and Personal Narrative of 
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apparent reason or business.”140  And of course, the ability of 
the state to claim victim-status for victimless “crimes” contin-
ues today.  It is this fiction that the state is harmed that al-
lowed officers to forcibly arrest Eric Garner for selling loose 
cigarettes.141  And to claim victimization when good Samari-
tans provide humanitarian aid in the form of water and food for 
immigrants attempting to cross the border.142  And to seize 
assets associated with victimless crimes as “forfeited” and add 
them to the coffers of the “victim” state.143 
Most importantly, the turn to public prosecutors and the 
concomitant ability of the state to claim victimization have un-
derwritten the War on Drugs, resulting in the incarceration of 
more users than distributors.  The creation of a system of state 
prosecutors not only allowed the state to claim victim-status 
when someone engages in the recreational use of drugs.  It also 
allowed the state to claim to be victimized by some drug use 
more than other drug use.  Hence, it could treat the use of 
crack cocaine more severely than the use of cocaine, and more 
severely than the current use of opioids, in ways that just hap-
pen to correlate with race.144  There is a reason why the War on 
Drugs served as one of the major drivers of mass incarceration 
Loving v. Virginia, 41 HOW. L.J. 229, 234–35 (1998) (noting the long history of 
interracial couplings that went unprosecuted). 
140 This is of course a reference to our history of arresting and prosecuting 
outsiders for “loitering.” See, e.g., Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983) (find-
ing a statute that required persons who loiter to provide “credible and reliable” 
identification void for vagueness); Charles A. Reich, Police Questioning of Law 
Abiding Citizens, 75 YALE L.J. 1161, 1161–66 (1966) (criticizing the ability of 
police to engage in various “preventive” police stops for potential loitering). 
141 See Al Baker et al., Beyond the Chokehold: The Path to Eric Garner’s Death, 
N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/14/nyregion/ 
eric-garner-police-chokehold-staten-island.html [https://perma.cc/7Z9B-
NDPK]. 
142 Lorne Matalon, Extending ‘Zero Tolerance’ to People Who Help Migrants 
Along the Border, NPR (May 28, 2019, 4:22 PM), https://www.npr.org/2019/05/ 
28/725716169/extending-zero-tolerance-to-people-who-help-migrants-along-
the-border [https://perma.cc/C5XA-PC8Y] 
143 See ALEXANDER, supra note 12, at 78–84. 
144 See Khiara M. Bridges, Race, Pregnancy, and the Opioid Epidemic: White 
Privilege and the Criminalization of Opioid Use During Pregnancy, 133 HARV. L. 
REV. 770, 788–92 (2020) (describing the differences in response to the crack 
epidemic and the opioid epidemic); Ekow N. Yankah, When Addiction Has a White 
Face, N.Y. TIMES, (Feb. 9, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/09/opin-
ion/when-addiction-has-a-white-face.html [https://perma.cc/RQN6-3F3T] (sim-
ilar). Cf. Kimani Paul-Emile, Making Sense of Drug Regulation: A Theory of Law 
for Drug Control Policy, 19 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 691, 711, 729–30 (2010) 
(“[T]he extent to which the drug is identified with racial minorities or other 
marginalized groups will determine whether the drug will ultimately ever move 
from the [criminal regulatory] regime.”). 
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and overcriminalization,145 a reason why it is referred to as the 
“raced” War on Drugs,146 and that reason has everything to do 
with the advent of public prosecutors and the prosecution of 
victimless crimes. 
In short, our history of private prosecution and the turn to 
public prosecution explains much about many of the seemingly 
intractable problems in the criminal justice system.147  All of 
this begs questions.  What alternatives might open up if we 
imagine a world without, or at least with far fewer, prosecu-
tors?  What might it mean to reject the notion of the state as the 
“real” victim of crime and to instead imagine a criminal justice 
system in which real victims have the power to decide whether 
or not to seek recompense, whether in the form of monetary 
compensation or restorative justice or punishment?  These are 
the questions I take up below. 
III 
BENEFITS 
It has been said that “we are in the midst of a criminal 
justice ‘moment,’ when extraordinary reform may be possi-
ble.”148  If that is true, and I am persuaded it is, what alterna-
tives might open up if we imagine a world without prosecutors, 
or at least with far fewer prosecutors?  To be clear, I am not 
suggesting a return to purely private prosecutions or a system 
in which wealth inequality would allow some people to pursue 
private actions and preclude others.  But what if, instead of 
145 Although only about seventeen percent of state prisoners in 2010 were 
incarcerated due to drug crimes, that number alone is significant.  Perhaps more 
importantly, focusing solely on the percentage of inmates at any particular time 
obscures the importance of the flow of inmates.  Focusing on flow, it becomes 
clear that more people are admitted to prison for drug crimes than for violent 
crimes or property crimes. See Jonathan Rothwell, Drug Offenders in American 
Prisons: The Critical Distinction Between Stock and Flow, BROOKINGS  INSTITUTION 
(Nov. 25, 2015), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/social-mobility-memos/2015/ 
11/25/drug-offenders-in-american-prisons-the-critical-distinction-between-
stock-and-flow/ [https://perma.cc/25QK-LEVK]. 
146 Benjamin D. Steiner & Victor Argothy, White Addiction: Racial Inequality, 
Racial Ideology, and the War on Drugs, 10 TEMP. POL. & C. R. L. REV. 443, 443 
(2001) (describing the War on Drugs as a “raced war”). 
147 For example, it is telling that in Allen Steinberg’s study of crime in Philadel-
phia during the nineteenth century, victimless crimes such as public drunken-
ness, disorderly conduct, and vagrancy were usually state-initiated rather than 
the result of private prosecutions, and that the number of prosecutions for vic-
timless crimes increased with the expansion of the police. STEINBERG, supra note 
72, at 29–30. 
148 John Rappaport, Some Doubts About “Democratizing” Criminal Justice, 87 
U. CHI. L. REV (forthcoming, 2020) (manuscript at 8) (on file with author). 
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using the public fisc to solely fund public prosecutions, we 
used that fisc to also fund private prosecutions?149 
What might it mean to allow a victim of theft, for example, 
to not only initiate a prosecution but also to prioritize, via pros-
ecution, a return of the stolen item or financial damages?  Or a 
hate crime victim to decide what is more important to him, 
punishment or an apology?  Or a victim of domestic violence to 
decide whether to pursue charges or not, to decide whether 
incarceration of her partner is best for her or their children, 
and to decide whether mandating anger management classes 
or substance abuse classes might benefit her more?  To be 
sure, returning prosecutions to the people runs the risk of 
empowering a few individuals to pursue personal vendettas 
and malicious prosecutions.150  Yet even here, there is a 
gatekeeping mechanism in the intermediary of first a judge and 
then a grand jury to screen cases that lack probable cause, are 
unmeritorious, or are malicious.151  We could even imagine ju-
risdictions requiring complainants to first post a bond of some 
sort, on a sliding scale tied to ability to pay, before allowing 
criminal cases to proceed, or allowing judges to impose sanc-
tions for frivolous cases or cases brought solely to harass.152 
Even after these screenings, there is yet another gatekeeper: 
the trial jury.  We would all do well to recall that the trial jury 
originally had much more power; for de Tocqueville, the jury 
149 Obviously, one of the major flaws of the Colonial system of private prosecu-
tions was that victims who could afford to hire attorneys to prosecute on their 
behalf had an advantage over victims who could not, and who were therefore left 
to manage their cases pro se. See Fairfax, supra note 86, at 422–23. 
150 See STEINBERG, supra note 72, at 42–43.  This is not to suggest our current 
system of public prosecution is free from personal vendettas and malicious 
prosecutions. 
151 The grand jury served the same gatekeeping function under the English 
system of private prosecutions. See LANGBEIN, supra note 75, at 45.  In theory at 
least, the grand jury still serves that screening function today, and this is its key 
role. See Roger A. Fairfax Jr., Does Grand Jury Discretion Have a Legitimate (and 
Useful) Role to Play in Criminal Justice?, in GRAND JURY 2.0: MODERN PERSPECTIVES 
ON THE GRAND JURY 57, 57–58 (Roger Anthony Fairfax, Jr., ed., 2011) (“Where the 
grand jury truly adds value is through its ability to exercise robust discretion not 
to indict where probable cause nevertheless exists—what some might term ‘grand 
jury nullification.’”).  However, in practice, the ability of the grand jury to serve 
this role diminished as public prosecutors gained more power to charge, call 
witnesses, and present evidence. See Raymond Moley, The Initiation of Criminal 
Prosecutions by Indictment or Information, 29 MICH. L. REV. 403, 430 (1931) (ob-
serving that the modern prosecutor “seems to dominate the grand jury to such a 
degree that its actions are in reality his own, and for that reason they should be 
his nominally as well as actually”); see also R. Justin Miller, Informations or 
Indictments in Felony Cases, 8 MINN. L. REV. 379, 397–99 (1924) (similar). 
152 This could be similar to the Rule 11 sanctions that are already available for 
civil cases. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c). 
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functioned almost as a fourth branch of government, a check 
against overreach.153 
More importantly, what might it mean to reserve the de-
fault of public prosecution for only those matters where the 
state truly is a victim, or where regulatory expertise is essen-
tial, or where non-divisible harm truly effects a swath of the 
population, such as environmental crimes or crimes arising out 
of financial regulation?154  Going one step further, what might 
it mean to abandon public prosecution for “crimes” where the 
state cannot claim victimization at all, “crimes” that run the 
gamut from sex work to selling or possessing sex toys155 to 
status crimes which essentially criminalize homelessness;156 
in other words, “crimes” which should really be considered 
non-crimes? 
Again, I am not suggesting that we rely exclusively on pri-
vate prosecutions where victims are involved.  But I am sug-
gesting a system where victims have a range of options, 
including the option to pursue justice themselves.  For exam-
ple, consider a system in which a crime victim, say a burglary 
victim, has five options.  One, to prosecute the case herself, i.e., 
swearing out a complaint before a magistrate, seeking an in-
dictment, and negotiating a disposition or taking the case to 
trial.  Two, assuming she would like to see the perpetrator 
brought to justice, but would prefer not to pursue the case 
herself, she could cede her right to prosecute the case to a 
public prosecutor.  Three, if she wants to retain control but 
would like assistance in negotiating the criminal justice sys-
tem, she could seek assistance from a prosecutor-advocate 
provided by the state.  Four, if she wants to retain control and 
153 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 311–18 (Arthur Goldham-
mer trans., Library of Am. 2004) (1835). 
154 This in fact was the practice before the advent of public prosecutors.  In 
addition, during parts of the 16th and 17th centuries in England, justices of the 
peace functioned as “back-up prosecutors” when private prosecution was not 
possible. See Langbein, supra note 73, at 323. 
155 See, e.g., Richard Glover, Can’t Buy a Thrill: Substantive Due Process, 
Equal Protection, and Criminalizing Sex Toys, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 555, 
556 (2010); Brett Barrouquere, In Texas, Even Possession of a Sex Toy is Regu-
lated, HOUST. CHRON. (May 21, 2017, 8:42 AM), https://www.chron.com/news/ 
politics/texas/article/In-Texas-even-possession-of-a-sex-toy-is-11161211.php 
[https://perma.cc/LZX2-Z2R5]. 
156 See, e.g., RISA  GOLUBOFF, VAGRANT  NATION: POLICE  POWER, CONSTITUTIONAL 
CHANGE, AND THE MAKING OF THE 1960S, at 2–3 (2016) (describing vagrancy laws as 
a means of controlling those who threatened the social order); Jamelia N. Morgan, 
Rethinking Disorderly Conduct, CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming, 2021) (manuscript at 
13–15) (on file with author) (discussing how disorderly conduct laws exclude from 
public spaces those homeless who engage in survival strategies). 
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would like assistance in negotiating the criminal justice sys-
tem, but would prefer not to rely on the state at all, she could 
seek assistance from a prosecutor advocate not provided by the 
state but instead by not-for-profits or community groups, 
which already are staking for themselves a larger role in the 
criminal justice system.157  And finally, five, perhaps the most 
important option and one that has for too long gone underthe-
orized: she would have the option to “let the matter go” and not 
pursue prosecution at all.  The common denominator in these 
options is that, absent extraordinary circumstances, the initial 
power to decide resides not with the state but with the victim 
herself and by extension with the people. 
To be sure, one can imagine numerous situations—the 
aforementioned extraordinary circumstances—in which we 
might want the state to have the primary decision-making au-
thority.  These may include cases involving child abuse, certain 
cases of domestic violence, other types of cases involving vic-
tim/witness coercion and intimidation, homicide cases, or 
cases in which the victim is deceased and has no next-of-kin 
with decision making authority.  The point here is not to ex-
haust the types of cases in which we may welcome state inter-
vention as the primary decision-maker.  The point is to suggest 
that in most instances, the state’s usurpations of the victim’s 
role should not be automatic.  Rather, the state should have to 
make some kind of showing to a judge before being permitted to 
supplant the victim’s authority to decide. 
Although I am bracketing in this Article how a move to 
private prosecutions can be effectuated, one could easily imag-
ine progressive prosecutors themselves playing a significant 
role.  For example, progressive prosecutors could train incom-
ing line assistants to serve as prosecutor-advocates to work for 
actual crime victims (much in the way public defense lawyers 
work for their clients) and assist them with an array of options, 
ranging from restorative justice to prosecution.  This alone 
would set some of the groundwork necessary for a system that 
157 For examples of the ways community members are asserting more control 
in the justice system, see Jocelyn Simonson, Bail Nullification, 115 Mich. L. Rev. 
585, 587 (2017) (describing the growth of community groups that “use bail funds 
to post bail on behalf of strangers, using a revolving pool of money”); Jocelyn 
Simonson, The Criminal Court Audience in a Post-Trial World, 127 HARV. L. REV. 
2173, 2181–83 (2014) (describing the power of the courtroom audience, “born 
from its physical presence in the courtroom,” and the rise of “courtwatch” groups 
in disadvantaged communities). 
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shifts power from public prosecutors and gives it to the 
people.158 
Having sketched out—concededly in broad strokes—what 
options a victim would have if we returned power to the people, 
and having gestured to how such a transition could be effected, 
the remainder of this Part turns to some of the benefits that 
might flow from such a realignment of power. 
One, instead of a system in which prosecutors decide 
which cases are worthy of pursuit, “we the people,” including 
those of us who have traditionally had little power, would now 
have the ability to seek justice and to achieve it ourselves. 
Consider again the failure of many prosecutors to pursue sex 
assault prosecutions.159  Consider too the blue on black vio-
lence160 that the Black Lives Matter movement has brought 
into the national conversation.  Police kill about 1,000 civilians 
every year161 and use excessive force in many multiples more— 
and yet prosecutors, who have a symbiotic relationship with 
the police, are loath to bring charges against officers.162  These 
cases also reflect what scholars have identified, and what many 
black and brown people know firsthand, as under-enforce-
158 I am thinking here of jurisdictions experimenting with providing victims 
more decision-making authority in prosecutions.  The words of Richard Briffault, 
who in turn was channeling Justice Brandeis, come to mind: 
Many years ago, Justice Brandeis famously offered a defense of 
federalism in terms of the possibility that state autonomy provides 
for innovation.  As he observed, “a single courageous state may, if its 
citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and eco-
nomic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”  Well, if 
the fifty states are laboratories for public policy formation, then 
surely the 3,000 counties and 15,000 municipalities provide loga-
rithmically more opportunities for innovation, experimentation, and 
reform.  Thousands of local governments provide thousands of are-
nas for innovation. 
Richard Briffault, Home Rule for the Twenty-First Century, 36 URB. L. 253, 259 
(2004) (quoting New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Bran-
deis, J., dissenting)). 
159 See supra notes 18 to 30 and accompanying text. 
160 See Devon W. Carbado, From Stopping Black People to Killing Black People: 
The Fourth Amendment Pathways to Police Violence, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 125, 
127–130 (2017). 
161 John Sullivan et al., Four Years in a Row, Police Nationwide Fatally Shoot 




162 Barry Friedman puts it bluntly.  “As we have seen, left to their own devices, 
lawmakers who must stand for election would rather not regulate the police.” 
BARRY FRIEDMAN, UNWARRANTED: POLICING WITHOUT PERMISSION 101 (2017). See also 
Kate Levine, Who Shouldn’t Prosecute the Police, 101 IOWA L REV. 1447, 1449–52 
(2006) (applying conflicts-of-interest law to argue that local prosecutors should 
not handle cases involving police-defendants). 
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ment.163  To the extent prosecutors decline to pursue charges 
notwithstanding probable cause to proceed or the victim’s (or 
victim’s family’s) wishes, these prosecutors engage in what 
Austin Sarat might call “lawful lawlessness,”164 and what 
others have called “the ‘mortality’ of cases,”165 both of which 
are entirely “legal” given a system in which prosecutors hold a 
monopoly over criminal prosecutions and discretion.  Now 
again, imagine a system in which the victim has an array of 
options, all of which ultimately vest her with the choice of how 
and when to prosecute, subject to screening by the grand jury, 
the petit jury, and a judge?  Consider a system that allows her 
to request the type of redress that would “reaffirm [her] worth,” 
to borrow from Jean Hampton,166 a redress that might include 
restorative justice and rehabilitation.  Consider too that for 
many victims, “the opportunity to shape what repair looks like 
can be the most transformative part of the accountability 
process.”167 
Equally important, victims would also have the right not to 
pursue charges, to “let the matter go.”  We can all imagine a 
victim of a petty crime being willing to let the matter go, espe-
cially in situations where the victim senses the harm to the 
perpetrator and his community will far outweigh the benefit to 
herself.  Consider the case Ewing v. California, in which Gary 
Ewing, a drug addict, was prosecuted for stealing three golf 
clubs from a sports shop to presumably pawn and feed his 
habit.168  Even here we can imagine that the owner of the 
sports shop might decline to pursue charges, especially if he 
knew Ewing would be sentenced to twenty-five years to life, a 
sentence the Supreme Court would affirm.  Or we can imagine 
a victim being open to reaching an out of court resolution with 
the offender.169  The important thing is that all victims should 
163 See RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 19–20 (1997); Alexandra 
Natapoff, Underenforcement, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1715, 1716–22 (2006). 
164 Austin Sarat & Nasser Hussain, On Lawful Lawlessness: George Ryan, 
Executive Clemency, and the Rhetoric of Sparing Life, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1307, 1312 
(2004). 
165 Samuel Walker, Origins of the Contemporary Criminal Justice Paradigm: 
The American Bar Foundation Survey, 1953–1969, 9 JUST. Q. 47, 53 (1992). 
166 MURPHY & HAMPTON, supra note 135, at 126. 
167 DANIELLE  SERED, UNTIL  WE  RECKON: VIOLENCE, MASS  INCARCERATION, AND A 
ROAD TO  REPAIR 114 (2019).  “Trauma,” Sered adds, “is fundamentally about 
powerlessness, so having the power to direct the future that arises out of the past 
can contribute significantly to a person’s healing process.” Id. 
168 538 U.S. 11, 17–20 (2003). 
169 See, e.g., Ric Simmons, Private Criminal Justice, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 
911, 917–18 (2007) (discussing the possibility of private mediation as an alterna-
tive to the criminal justice system). 
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be able to exercise this type of agency, even victims of domestic 
violence.170  Too often, domestic violence victims are revic-
timized by the state, forced to participate in a prosecution re-
sulting in incarceration even when incarceration of their 
abusers causes more harm than good.171  Even here, after en-
suring that victims are aware of all of the options and the risk, 
the decision should lie with the victim whether to pursue pros-
ecution and if so, on what terms.172  For example, the victim 
may be satisfied with the issuance of a peace warrant that 
labels the perpetrator’s behavior as a potential offense and re-
quires the perpetrator to keep the peace going forward or face 
prosecution.173  Indeed, having the power to chart one’s own 
course is one way to make victims whole. 
Two, when we transfer power from state prosecutors to the 
people, we may realize that many of the victimless “crimes” we 
take for granted are not deserving of prosecution at all.  Drug 
use and distribution are the biggest examples since they are 
significant drivers of our incarceration rates, but this would 
also include the criminalization of minor acts Devon Carbado 
170 I emphasize domestic violence victims because, as a society, we have be-
come used to deeming such victims incapable of making rational decisions.  We 
engage in a type of paternalism, or even maternalism. See Bennett Capers, On 
‘Violence Against Women,’ 13 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 347, 360 (2016). 
171 See Goodmark, Prosecutorial Misconduct, supra note 62, at 638–40; Leigh 
Goodmark, Autonomy Feminism: An Anti-Essentialist Critique of Mandatory Inter-
ventions in Domestic Violence Cases, 37 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 3–5 (2009); cf. 
Jeannie Suk, Criminal Law Comes Home, 116 YALE L.J. 2, 53, 56–58 (2006) 
(describing a panoply of prosecutorial practices that deliberately override the 
preferences of domestic violence victims, including the imposition of protective 
orders that function as “de facto divorce”). 
172 In a sense, this is a return. As Roger Fairfax has observed, “[c]omplainants 
in the system of private prosecution could, and often did, settle their criminal 
cases out of court.”  Fairfax, supra note 86, at 423.  In particular, Critical Race 
Theorists have attended to why a victim may view pursuing charges as not in the 
victim’s best interest, especially when pursuing charges primarily benefits the 
state and disadvantages communities. See, e.g., Regina Austin, “The Black Com-
munity,” Its Lawbreakers, and a Politics of Identification, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1769, 
1774 (1992) (exploring the practice in black communities of identifying with law-
breakers “as an act of defiance” against the larger polity); Kimberle Crenshaw, 
Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Wo-
men of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1257 (1991) (noting that minority victims of 
domestic violence are sometimes reluctant to request police intervention, given “a 
police force that is frequently hostile.”); cf. Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullifi-
cation: Black Power in the Criminal Justice System, 105 YALE L.J. 677, 679 (1995) 
(arguing that “for pragmatic and political reasons, the black community is better 
off when some nonviolent lawbreakers remain in the community rather than go to 
prison”). 
173 For more on peace warrants, see LAURA F. EDWARDS, THE PEOPLE AND THEIR 
PEACE 73–74 (2009).  For a discussion of peace warrants in the context of domestic 
violence, see Ariela Gross, Beyond Black and White: Cultural Approaches to Race 
and Slavery, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 640, 658 (2001). 
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puts under the umbrella of “mass criminalization,” such as 
spitting in public.174 
Put differently, returning decision-making authority to vic-
tims of crime might prompt us to reconsider the very concept of 
victimless crimes, and recognize how much the harm princi-
ple—once the sine qua non of legal intervention—has been col-
lapsed.175  To be sure, the state may be harmed by a variety of 
acts.  But there are other acts that we criminalize—again, think 
of sex work or recreational drug use—where harm to the state 
seems nonexistent or at best is attenuated.  Once we divide 
crimes into those that involve an actual victim and those where 
the state is a truly a victim (such as tax fraud), we are likely to 
discover that there are numerous “crimes” that do not fall into 
either category.  Recognizing this might in turn spur us to 
question why truly victimless crimes—again, crimes where 
neither the state nor the people are victims—are designated as 
crimes at all.  We might realize that so many of the “crimes” we 
think of as criminal justice problems are best addressed in 
other ways.  We might for example recognize that the best way 
to address the opioid crisis or homelessness is not through 
criminal prosecution but through a public health response. 
The same may true of other crises, such as the plague of gun 
violence.176  In brief, returning criminal decision-making power 
to the people has the potential to remake our entire system of 
criminal justice. 
Three, returning decision-making power to crime victims 
may very well lead to collateral benefits to criminal justice ju-
risprudence.  Right now, the problem is not just that public 
prosecutors wield enormous power.  The problem is also that 
174 Devon W. Carbado, Blue-on-Black Violence: A Provisional Model of Some of 
the Causes, 104 GEO. L.J. 1479, 1487 (2016). 
175 The “harm principle,” traceable to John Stuart Mill’s essay ON  LIBERTY, 
posits that the state should deprive someone of liberty only when necessary to 
prevent harm to others. See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 9 (Elizabeth Rapaport 
ed., 1978) (1859).  H.L.A. Hart also embraced this formulation. See H.L.A. HART, 
LAW, LIBERTY, AND  MORALITY 60-61, 75–77 (1963).  For a discussion of how the 
harm principle has been watered down as to become meaningless and devolved to 
permit state intervention to police almost any act, see Bernard E. Harcourt, The 
Collapse of the Harm Principle, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 109, 113–16 (1999). 
176 See, e.g., DAVID  HEMENWAY, PRIVATE  GUNS, PUBLIC  HEALTH 8–26 (rev. ed. 
2017) (arguing for treating gun violence as a public health problem and using 
tools of prevention); Zachary R. Rowan et al., Proximal Predictors of Gun Violence 
Among Adolescent Males Involved in Crime, 43 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 250, 256–57 
(2019) (similar); see also Ben Green et al., Modeling Contagion Through Social 
Networks to Explain and Predict Gunshot Violence in Chicago, 2006 to 2014, 177 
JAMA Internal Med. 326, 330–31 (2017) (modeling gun violence as a social conta-
gion and tracking its spread). 
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their power is almost completely unchecked.177  Most troub-
ling, the Court, reading the due process and equal protection 
clauses narrowly, has limited its supervision.  For example, the 
Court has imposed no limits on a prosecutor’s ability to 
threaten draconian sentences to “induce” pleas.  Thus, a threat 
to subject a defendant to a mandatory life sentence if he failed 
to take a five-year plea for passing a false check in the amount 
of $88.30 was held constitutional in Bordenkircher v. Hayes.178 
Similarly, although the Court in Brady v. Maryland179 read the 
due process clause as requiring prosecutors to disclose excul-
patory information, the Court neutralized this directive by in-
cluding a materiality requirement and by allowing prosecutors 
to postpone disclosure until the eve of trial.180  Beyond this, 
Brady provides nothing to the overwhelming majority of de-
fendants who plead guilty in lieu of trial.181  Even when it 
comes to racial discrimination in jury selection, the Court has 
provided little oversight and has instead created a burden-
shifting test in Batson v. Kentucky182 that insulates all but the 
most “unapologetically bigoted or painfully unimaginative” 
prosecutors.183  Part of the reason the Court provides so little 
oversight has to do with the trust courts extend to public pros-
ecutors.184  Courts are unlikely to extend such automatic trust 
to lay prosecutors who prosecute their own cases directly or 
with the aid of a prosecutor advocate.  And this may result in 
collateral benefits.  Courts and legislative bodies, faced with 
nonprofessional prosecutors, will likely respond by bringing 
177 See, e.g., Barkow, supra note 6, at 885–86 (noting that the expansion of 
prosecutorial power occurred without corresponding checks by Congress or the 
Supreme Court). 
178 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978) (concluding that “in the ‘give-and-take’ of plea 
bargaining, there is no . . . element of punishment or retaliation so long as the 
accused is free to accept or reject the prosecution’s offer”). 
179 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
180 Id. at 87. 
181 For an overview of a prosecutor’s disclosure requirements under Brady 
and some of the decision’s flaws, see Baer, supra note 3, at 11–15. 
182 476 U.S. 80 (1986). 
183 Jeffrey Bellin & Junichi P. Semitsu, Widening Batson’s Net to Ensnare More 
than the Unapologetically Bigoted or Painfully Unimaginative Attorney, 96 CORNELL 
L. REV. 1075, 1075 (2011).  For additional critiques of Batson, see Robin Charlow, 
Tolerating Deception and Discrimination After Batson, 50 STAN. L. REV. 9, 10–16 
(1997); Camille A. Nelson, Batson, O.J., and Snyder: Lessons from an Intersecting 
Trilogy, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1687, 1688–92 (2008). 
184 Some of this is attributable to the fact that a disproportionate number of 
trial judges are former prosecutors.  This is not a recent phenomenon. See Nor-
man Lefstein, Book Review, 56 TEMP. L. Q. 1101, 1110–11 (1983) (reviewing ALAN 
M. DERSHOWITZ, THE BEST DEFENSE (1982)) (noting that a “high percentage of judges 
are former prosecutors”). 
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more oversight to all prosecutors, something that scholars 
such as Kenneth Culp Davis and Bill Stuntz have long advo-
cated.185  If this happens, we may all very well be the 
beneficiaries. 
Four relates to the benefit above but focuses directly on the 
impact on society.  Allowing victims to directly prosecute de-
fendants who have harmed them—again subject to the 
gatekeeping of the grand jury, the petit jury, and the judge— 
may well prompt us to rethink how we see the adversarial 
process in the criminal justice system.  We tend to think of 
public prosecutors as representing “the people” and we fund 
them accordingly.  Indeed, the French philosopher Michel Fou-
cault might even say we have been disciplined into aligning 
ourselves with prosecutors.186  It is quite likely, however, that 
as more crime victims assert their right to seek redress directly, 
this notion that “the people” stand on one side of the “v.” while 
the defendant stands alone on the other will start to crum-
ble.187  We will begin to see victims and defendants.  This alone 
will neutralize some of the power public prosecutors have.  But 
it may also do something else equally consequential: it may 
prompt us to rethink why we provide so much funding to public 
prosecutors and comparatively so little to public defenders.188 
185 See, e.g., KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 
207–14 (1969) (noting the lack of effective enforcement mechanisms to check 
prosecutorial misconduct); William J. Stuntz, Bordenkircher v. Hayes: The Rise of 
Plea Bargaining and the Decline of the Rule of Law 26–28 (Harvard Law Sch. Pub. 
Law, Working Paper No. 120, 2005), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=854284 (arguing for a standard that would require prosecutors to 
show that the threatened sentence has been proposed in similar cases or require 
that the judge find that the threatened sentence was fair and proportionate to the 
defendant’s criminal conduct). 
186 For a discussion of how criminal procedure jurisprudence and practices 
discipline all of us in a Foucauldian sense, see I. Bennett Capers, Criminal Proce-
dure and the Good Citizen, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 653, 671–79 (2018).  Here, we have 
been disciplined to think of the prosecutor as on our side.  More troubling for 
defendants and the notion of fair trials, we have also been disciplined to think of 
ourselves on the side of the prosecutor. 
187 Cf. Simonson, supra note 74, at 286–87, 294–95 (arguing for a criminal 
justice system that allows “the people” to play a role on both sides of the “v.”). 
188 See, e.g., Mary Sue Backus & Paul Marcus, The Right to Counsel in Crimi-
nal Cases, A National Crisis, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 1031, 1046–54 (2006) (describing 
the various funding levels in different states); Barkow, supra note 6, at 882 (“Pub-
lic defender offices are woefully underfunded and understaffed.”); Martin Guggen-
heim, The People’s Right to a Well-Funded Indigent Defender System, 36 N.Y.U. 
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 395, 401–05 (2012) (describing a “crisis” in funding for 
indigent defense).  This change may even prompt us to support the appointment 
of a Defender General, a public official to represent the collective interests of 
defendants—as a counterpart to the Solicitor General. See Daniel Epps & William 
Ortman, The Defender General, 168 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021). 
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This alone can do much to level the playing field between prose-
cution and defense and get us closer to a process that is fair 
and consistent with justice. 
Five, shifting power back to the people can bring prosecu-
tion out of the shadows and into the open as something we do. 
This may at first seem a matter of little consequence, but in fact 
the consequences are far-reaching.  As we begin to think of 
prosecution as something we do, we may question the constant 
ratcheting up of the criminal codes.  Consider just one statistic: 
as of 2003 over 4,000 separate federal crimes were in the U.S. 
federal code,189 and almost half of these “crimes” were added to 
the code after 1970.190  We may come to see criminalization for 
what it is: “an expansionist power, pushing into its neigh-
bors.”191  More significantly, we may come to see “that some-
times it makes sense to ‘keep the law at bay.’”192  And we may 
realize, as Robert Ellickson did years ago, that the notion that 
legal institutions are always necessary to maintain order is 
false.  Neighbors can solve problems without state intervention. 
Even strangers can solve problems without state intervention. 
We can have order without law.193 
Six, a system in which “we the people,” including those of 
us who have traditionally had little power, are empowered to 
seek justice may be our best hope of resurrecting mercy, for-
giveness,194 and what Joshua Kleinfeld might call normative 
reconstruction.195  This argument may strike many as contrary 
189 JOHN S. BAKER, JR., & DALE E. BENNETT, FEDERALIST SOC’Y FOR LAW & PUB. 
POLICY STUDIES, MEASURING THE EXPLOSIVE GROWTH OF FEDERAL CRIME LEGISLATION 3 
(2004). 
190 AM. BAR ASS’N TASK FORCE ON THE FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW, THE FED-
ERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW 7 (1998)) (emphasis omitted) (“More than 40% of the 
federal criminal provisions enacted since the Civil War have been enacted since 
1970.”). 
191 Joshua Kleinfeld, Manifesto of Democratic Criminal Justice, 111 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1367, 1372 (2017). 
192 I. Bennett Capers, Afrofuturism, Critical Race Theory, and Policing in the 
Year 2044, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 55 (2019) (quoting Regina Austin, “The Black 
Community,” Its Lawbreakers, and a Politics of Identification, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 
1769, 1808 (1992)). 
193 See generally ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER  WITHOUT  LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS 
SETTLE DISPUTES (1991) (analyzing how a rural community uses informal norms to 
settle disagreements). 
194 For an exploration of the role law can play in facilitating forgiveness, see 
Martha Minow, Forgiveness, Law, and Justice, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 1615, 1620–26 
(2015). 
195 See Joshua Kleinfeld, Reconstructivism: The Place of Criminal Law in Ethi-
cal Life, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1485, 1486 (2016) (offering reconstructivism as an 
alternative theory of punishment and stating that reconstructivism views punish-
ment as “a way of reconstructing a violated social order in the wake of an attack”). 
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to common knowledge; we think of ourselves as living in a 
society where penal populism predominates.  If we were to take 
a snapshot of the country at the time states were adopting 
three-strike laws, embracing sentences of life without parole, 
creating sex offender registries, or passing the Violent Crime 
Control and Law Enforcement Act, this view of us as punitive 
would be true.196  But it becomes less true when we take a 
longer view.  After all, for the roughly two centuries between the 
1770s and the 1970s, the American criminal justice system 
was, for the most part, one of “reasonable compassion.”197 
Now, as this country wrestles with mass incarceration and the 
knowledge that we have the highest incarceration rate in the 
world,198 the tide seems to be turning.  Certainly, the problem 
of mass incarceration is framing national politics.  Even the 
Court is trending towards mercy.  Consider its decision in 
Miller v. Alabama, barring life without parole for juveniles,199 a 
decision that the Court in Montgomery v. Louisiana held should 
be applied retroactively,200 or Madison v. Alabama, overturning 
a death sentence for a prisoner who, because of a mental disa-
bility, could not understand the reason for his execution,201 or 
196 See PETER K. ENNS, INCARCERATION NATION: HOW THE UNITED STATES BECAME 
THE MOST PUNITIVE DEMOCRACY IN THE WORLD 24–25, 31–38 (2016) (surveying puni-
tiveness and concluding that the U.S. public became more punitive from the mid-
1960s to the mid 1990s); JAMES  FORMAN, JR., LOCKING  UP  OUR  OWN: CRIME AND 
PUNISHMENT IN BLACK AMERICA 17–77 (2017) (detailing the rash of tough on crime 
legislation). 
197 Kleinfeld writes that popular reforms: 
[S]wept through the young country from the Founding through the 
mid-nineteenth century, substantially eliminating punishments of 
the body (corporal punishment and maiming); aiming to abolish and 
succeeding in limiting capital punishment (abolition was a major 
issue just after the Founding); experimenting with rehabilitative 
prisons; and codifying substantive criminal law so as to reduce 
pockets of harshness and arbitrariness and transfer control from 
the judiciary to the more popularly accountable legislature.  This 
penal moderation continued for most of the twentieth century: from 
the late 1920s through the early 1970s, America’s incarceration rate 
was fairly low, fairly stable, and roughly equal to what it is in West-
ern European countries today. 
Kleinfeld, supra note 191, at 1369 (footnotes omitted).  Kleinfeld acknowledges 
one major exception to this “reasonable compassion”: many communities’ puni-
tive attitudes with respect to African-Americans. Id. 
198 World Prison Populations, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/ 
spl/hi/uk/06/prisons/html/nn2page1.stm. [https://perma.cc/8JUS-Q7B7] 
(last visited Mar. 1, 2020). 
199 567 U.S. 460, 465 (2012). 
200 136 S.Ct. 718, 736 (2016). 
201 139 S.Ct. 718, 731 (2019). 
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even Brown v. Plata, upholding an order requiring California to 
reduce its prison population to address overcrowding.202 
More importantly, there is evidence to suggest that on the 
individual level, mercy may have purchase.  For example, Paul 
Robinson’s empirical work suggests that, contrary to popular 
assumptions, what people believe is the appropriate punish-
ment tends to be less than what the law actually prescribes.203 
The same, it turns out, is true for victims of crime.  A recent 
study from the National Survey of Victims’ Views found that 
“the overwhelming majority of crime victims believe that the 
criminal justice system relies too heavily on incarceration, and 
strongly prefer investments in prevention and treatment to 
more spending on prisons and jails.”204  This holds true for 
victims of violent crime.205  By a three to one margin, “victims 
prefer holding people accountable through options beyond just 
prison, such as rehabilitation, mental health treatment, drug 
treatment, community supervision, or community service.”206 
The same study found that, by a more than two to one margin, 
victims of violent crime believe prison is more likely to cause 
individuals to commit more crimes rather than rehabilitate 
them.207  Danielle Sered’s work with crime victims yielded simi-
lar responses, with the majority of victims, given the option, 
preferring a restorative justice process to incarceration.  As she 
writes, these are 
survivors . . . who participated in the criminal justice system. 
They are among the less than half of victims who called the 
police and are part of the even smaller subgroup who contin-
ued their engagement through the grand jury process.  They 
are people who initially chose a path that could lead to 
prison.  They are people who have suffered serious violence— 
knives to their bodies, guns to their heads, lacerations to 
their livers, punctured lungs—and have engaged in the crim-
inal justice system in a way likely to result in the incarcera-
tion of the person who hurt them.  Even among these victims, 
when another option is offered, 90 percent choose something 
202 563 U.S. 493, 499–502 (2011). 
203 Paul H. Robinson, Democratizing Criminal Law: Feasibility, Utility and the 
Challenge of Social Change, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1565, 1574–80 (2017). 
204 See ALLIANCE FOR  SAFETY AND  JUSTICE, CRIME  SURVIVORS  SPEAK: THE  FIRST-
EVER NATIONAL SURVEY OF VICTIMS’ VIEWS ON SAFETY AND JUSTICE 13 (2016), https:// 
allianceforsafetyandjustice.org/wp-content/uploads/documents/Crime%20Sur 
vivors%20Speak%20Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/W9N4-PTTE]. 
205 Id. at 16. 
206 Id. at 20. 
207 Id. at 21. 
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other than the very incarceration they were initially 
pursuing.208 
Put simply, more and more often victims are resisting the no-
tion that incarceration will right the wrong and are instead 
insisting on different models of justice, including models that 
bypass the criminal justice system entirely.209  Indeed, al-
though the public assumption is that victim interests align 
with the state, as Marie Manikis observes it “can also align with 
those of defendants.”210 
There is another reason why shifting power to victims may 
foster mercy.  One reason why prosecutors tend to be indiffer-
ent to incarceration is that local prosecutors bear little of the 
cost of incarceration, which is usually borne by the state.211 
The same is true with respect to citizens who, absent an incar-
cerated family member, externalize the cost of incarceration, 
and thus can easily support tough-on-crime measures.  But 
this dynamic changes when the expectation is that victims of 
crimes will initiate actions, or at least, decide to cede their 
actions to the state.  Citizens who will have to internalize the 
cost of pursuing cases—and here, I mean the cost of time 
rather than money—are very likely to think twice before pursu-
ing minor cases.  Department stores are already doing just this 
208 SERED, supra note 167, at 42. 
209 For a persuasive discussion of the promise of the restorative justice model 
even in cases of violence, see SERED, supra note 167, at 129–56.  For a discussion 
of an alternative to traditional restorative justice, which in some iterations func-
tions as “an adjunct to the criminal justice system while simultaneously denying 
its enmeshment in traditional probationary and sentencing regimes,” see M. Eve 
Hanan, Decriminalizing Violence: A Critique of Restorative Justiceand Proposal for 
Diversionary Mediation, 46 N.M. L. REV. 123, 125 (2016).  Other significant read-
ings include: Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Restorative Justice and the Jewish Ques-
tion, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 533, 548–54 (2003) (showing that restorative justice also 
has support in religion, including Christianity and Jewish law); Mia Mingus, 
Transformative Justice: A Brief Description, TRANSFORM  HARM, https://trans-
formharm.org/transformative-justice-a-brief-description/ [https://perma.cc/ 
3ARB-BHSB] (last visited Jan. 30, 2020) (describing the framework of “transform-
ative justice,” championed by prison abolitionist Miriame Kaba); Daniel H. Green-
wood, Restorative Justice and the Jewish Question, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 533, 
548–54 (2003) (showing that restorative justice also has support in religion, in-
cluding Christianity and Jewish law); Stefanie Mundhenk Harrelson, I Was Sexu-
ally Assaulted, And I Believe Incarcerating Rapists Doesn’t Help Victims Like Me, 
APPEAL (July 18, 2019), https://theappeal.org/i-was-sexually-assaulted-and-i-
believe-incarcerating-rapists-doesnt-help-victims-like-me/ [https://perma.cc/ 
3L2Y-DKB3]. 
210 Manikis, supra note 87, at 264. 
211 See Richard A. Bierschbach & Stephanos Bibas, Rationing Criminal Jus-
tice, 116 MICH. L. REV. 187, 189, 196–204 (2017); Adam M. Gershowitz, Consoli-
dating Local Criminal Justice: Should the Prosecutors Control the Jails?, 51 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 677, 679 (2016); Russell M. Gold, Promoting Democracy in Prosecu-
tion, 86 WASH. L. REV. 69, 82 (2011); STUNTZ, supra note 8, at 289. 
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by declining to call authorities, allowing first-time shoplifters to 
avoid the snare of the criminal justice system.212  A very similar 
dynamic is possible when decision making rests with victims. 
This too is a form of mercy. 
For the most part, I have bracketed the issue of race 
throughout this Article, even though “many of the problems 
that plague the criminal justice system—mass incarceration, 
over-criminalization, and capital punishment, to name just a 
few—are only intelligible through the lens of race.”213  But 
when it comes to thinking about the role returning prosecution 
to the people can play in fostering mercy, discussing race is 
essential.  Although many imagine victims as white and de-
fendants as black, the fact is that most crime remains intra-
racial—in no small part because our country still remains resi-
dentially segregated along lines of race.  For many black and 
brown victims of crime, and black and brown crime defend-
ants, this means that their cases are largely mediated through 
criminal justice actors—including prosecutors—who are over-
whelmingly white.214  While this may seem unproblematic, it 
212 See John Rappaport, Criminal Justice, Inc., 118 COLUM. L. REV. 2251, 
2266–76 (2018). 
213 Capers, supra note 192, at 5. 
214 A 2015 study found that ninety-five of elected prosecutors are white, and 
that sixty-six of states that elect prosecutors have no black prosecutors at all. 
Latinos make up just 1.7% of elected prosecutors. WOMEN  DONORS  NETWORK, 
Justice for All: Key Findings, (2015) https://wholeads.us/justice/wp-content/ 
themes/phase2/pdf/key-findings.pdf [https://perma.cc/C27S-T5H2]. Evidence 
suggests that minorities are also underrepresented among line prosecutors, given 
that minorities in general are underrepresented in the legal profession, with Afri-
can-Americans making up only five percent of all attorneys, and Latinos another 
five percent. AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA PROFILE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 8 (Aug. 2019), 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/images/news/2019/08/ 
ProfileOfProfession-total-hi.pdf [https://perma.cc/P5E6-LADN].  Although there 
is no national data on diversity in district attorneys’ offices, a study of demo-
graphic data regarding prosecutors in California found that whites made up sev-
enty percent of all prosecutors, even though they comprise just thirty-eight 
percent of the state’s population.  Debbie Mukamal & David Alan Sklansky, Op-
Ed: A Study of California Prosecutors Finds a Lack of Diversity, LA TIMES (July 29, 
2015, 4:43 AM), https://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-0729-sklan-
skymukamal-diversity-prosecutors-california-20150729-story.html [https:// 
perma.cc/WG69-ZF6X].  As Bryan Stevenson has observed, while society has paid 
attention to diversity in policing, “we haven’t paid much attention to prosecutors. 
And that role is a role that has largely been occupied by white men and that has 
changed almost not at all in the last 30 years.” Report Highlights Lack of Racial 
Diversity Among U.S. Prosecutors, NPR (July 7, 2015, 4:35 PM), https://www.npr. 
org/2015/07/07/420913863/report-highlights-lack-of-racial-diversity-among-
u-s-prosecutors [https://perma.cc/AUQ5-ECMG] (interviewing Bryan 
Stevenson). 
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“skews [the] decision-making”215 and leaves little room for ra-
cial empathy or for consideration of how prosecution and pun-
ishment may positively or negatively impact black and brown 
communities.216  In contrast, to the extent a victim brings the 
case herself and confronts the person who harmed her—again, 
most crimes are intra-racial—she is likely to confront a mem-
ber of her own community, someone who looks like her, some-
one of whom she might say, regardless of her religious or non-
religious belief, “but for the grace of god.”  Given that sixty-
three percent of blacks and forty-eight percent of Latinx have a 
family member who has been in jail or prison,217 she is likely to 
know firsthand the harm that prisons can do, not just to the 
incarcerated but also to their families.218  She is likely to intui-
tively grasp the “legal estrangement” communities suffer as a 
result of over-policing.219  She is likely to know too that a felony 
conviction may mean the disenfranchisement not only of the 
perpetrator but the decreased voting power of her community, 
especially given statistics that “one in every 13 black adults 
could not vote as the result of a felony conviction.”220  In large 
cities where prosecutor’s offices dole out what has been called 
“assembly-line justice,”221 shifting the decision to prosecute to 
victims may finally allow room for alternatives to prosecution— 
including a demand for greater community resources to pre-
vent crime in the future.222  Even more radically, it may begin a 
215 Jessica Brown, If It Pleases the Prosecution, KNOWABLEMAGAZINE.ORG (May 
22, 2019) (quoting David Alan Sklansky).  Danielle Sered makes a similar point. 
“One way that racial inequity manifests is in shaping who gets to decide what 
happens in response to harm.” SERED, supra note 167, at 153. 
216 See, e.g., Dorothy E. Roberts, The Social and Moral Cost of Mass Incarcera-
tion in African American Communities, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1271, 1281–97 (2004) 
(exploring the collateral consequences of mass imprisonment of African-
Americans). 
217 Peter K. Enns et al., What Percentage of Americans Have Ever Had a Family 
Member Incarcerated?: Evidence from the Family History of Incarceration Survey 
(FamHIS), 5 SOCIUS 1, 1 (2019). 
218 For an exploration of the impact of incarceration on the families of prison-
ers, see generally DONALD BRAMAN, DOING TIME ON THE OUTSIDE: INCARCERATION AND 
FAMILY LIFE IN URBAN AMERICA (2007). 
219 See Monica C. Bell, Police Reform and the Dismantling of Legal Estrange-
ment, 126 YALE L.J. 2054, 2066–68 (2017). 
220 Jean Chung, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, Felony Disenfranchisement: A Primer 
6 (2019), https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/felony-disenfranchise 
ment-a-primer/ [https://perma.cc/UAK9-YRXL]. 
221 Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 36 (1972). 
222 As James Forman documents, high crime communities often want a range 
of options to address crime—not just more police but also more jobs, better 
schools, and better housing.  Those requests are usually answered by jurisdic-
tions providing more police or tough-on-crimes laws, but little else. See FORMAN, 
supra note 196, at 12–13.  For a discussion of some of the promising programs 
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conversation about the state’s role in creating the conditions of 
crime—through structural oppression and wealth inequality— 
in the first place.223 
I have initially focused on the racial gap between most 
black and brown communities and most prosecutors because it 
most clearly illuminates the possibility of mercy, but a similar 
possibility may exist even absent a racial gap between commu-
nities and prosecutors.  This is because even where both victim 
and perpetrator are white—again, most crime is intra-racial—it 
is still likely that they are from the same community, and that 
this community may very well be different—in terms of median 
wealth, educational attainment, and social capital—from the 
one to which the prosecutor belongs.  Indeed, there is one other 
factor that is also likely to be similar.  While the percentage of 
blacks (63%) who have had an immediate family member incar-
cerated may seem staggering, the fact is that we have incarcer-
ated so many in this country that the number is also staggering 
for whites, 42% of whom have had an immediate family who 
was incarcerated.224  All of this opens up the possibility of em-
pathy.  Indeed, when a victim has the right to confront his 
offender—in short, when a victim has a counterpart to the right 
a defendant has under the Sixth Amendment to confront his 
accuser—it is not only the possibility of empathy that opens 
up.  It is also the possibility for recognition and even connec-
tion.225  All of this can contribute to a re-imagination and per-
high crime communities are currently pursuing, see Hannah Sassaman, To Heal 
Violence, Divest from Police and Jails, and Invest in Proven Community Solutions, 
PHIL. INQUIRER (July 10, 2019, 7:10 AM), https://www.inquirer.com/opinion/com 
mentary/philadelphia-homicides-summer-2019-policing-incarceration-201907 
10.html [https://perma.cc/VUE2-SWDD]; Elizabeth Van Brocklin, What Gun Vio-
lence Prevention Looks Like When it Focuses on the Communities Hurt the Most, 
THETRACE.ORG (July 10, 2019), https://www.thetrace.org/2019/07/gun-violence-
prevention-communities-of-color-funding/ [https://perma.cc/4FD6-XLHT]. 
223 For example, a recent study revealed that boys who grow up at the bottom 
ten percent of the income distribution are twenty times more likely to be incarcer-
ated than children born in top ten percent. ADAM  LOONEY & NICHOLAS  TURNER, 
WORK AND OPPORTUNITY BEFORE AND AFTER INCARCERATION 11–13 (. 2018), https:// 
www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/ 
es_20180314_looneyincarceration_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/4X6Q-YPAD]. 
That same study revealed that “[t]hree years prior to incarceration, only 49 per-
cent of prime-age men are employed, and, when employed, their median earnings 
were only $6,250. Only 13 percent earned more than $15,000.” Id. at 1.  See also 
Angela P. Harris, Heteropatriarchy Kills: Challenging Gender Violence in a Prison 
Nation, 37 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 13, 58 (2011) (“[E]ach incident of personal 
violence should be understood in a larger context of structural violence.”). 
224 Enns et al., supra note 217, at 1. 
225 One can think of this as a practical application of social network theory, or 
the notion that most people are connected by about six degrees of separation. See 
Stanley Milgram, The Small-World Problem, 1 PSYCHOL. TODAY 61, 64–65 (1967) 
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haps confluence of what justice will restore the victim, what 
justice will benefit us all, what justice is truly transforma-
tive,226 and what justice is just.  To be sure, not every victim 
will be inclined to show mercy to someone who harmed her, 
even if that person is from her community.  But a few will.227 
And these acts of mercy may very well have a signaling effect 
that encourages others to do the same.228 
There is one more thing to say about mercy and that is this: 
just as some victims may be inclined to show mercy, others will 
be inclined in the opposite direction.  They will insist on retri-
bution, and more.229  These victims may subscribe to the no-
tion that “it [is] highly desirable that criminals should be hated, 
[and] that the punishments inflicted upon them should be so 
contrived as to give expression to that hatred.”230  But even 
here, there is hope for mercy at the societal level.  A society that 
learns that the owner of a bakery, after being robbed of $50.75, 
sought and obtained a sentence of life imprisonment without 
the possibility of parole because he could—i.e., because the 
crime of theft allows for a sentence of life without parole231— 
(finding that random residents of Omaha, Nebraska could be connected to a target 
person in Boston, Massachusetts through a median of five individuals).  A prereq-
uisite for finding these connections is communication.  Assuming nonexceptional-
ism, a victim who actually communicates with a defendant is likely to find a 
similar chain of connections, whether it be that they attended the same elemen-
tary school, or that their mothers went to the same church, or something else. 
Any connection can change how the victim thinks about justice.  Tellingly, in 
John Guare’s play Six Degrees of Separation, which was based on true events, it is 
the fact that the protagonists recognize a connection to the man that has deceived 
them that motivates their decision to attempt to help him. JOHN  GUARE, SIX 
DEGREES OF SEPARATION 102–116 (1990). 
226 On transformative justice, see Mingus, supra note 209. 
227 A recent example is that of the family of Ann Margaret Grosmaire.  After 
arguing with Grosmaire on and off for nearly two days, her boyfriend of three 
years shot her in the face, then walked into a police station to confess to the 
crime.  Although the prosecutor charged the boyfriend with first-degree murder, 
exposing him to a mandatory life sentence, the victim’s family pleaded for less.  In 
short, the victim’s family asked for mercy. See Paul Tullis, Can Forgiveness Play a 
Role in Criminal Justice?, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Jan. 4, 2013), https://www.nytimes. 
com/2013/01/06/magazine/can-forgiveness-play-a-role-in-criminal-jus 
tice.html [https://perma.cc/MY3M-C56S]. 
228 Cf. Daniel T. Kobil, Should Mercy Have a Place in Clemency Decisions?, in 
FORGIVENESS, MERCY, AND CLEMENCY 36, 39 (Austin Sarat & Nasser Hussain eds., 
2006) (defining mercy as “an act of benevolence or compassion that reduces what 
is owed”). 
229 Put differently, they will disregard negative retributivism, the theory that 
no one should be punished more than he deserves; i.e., that retribution also 
functions as an upper limit on punishment. 
230 2 JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 82 
(1883). 
231 This is a reference to the recent case of Alvin Kennard, freed after being 
sentenced to life without parole and serving 35 years in prison for stealing $50.75 
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may very well revisit its penal code to reduce the maximum 
penalty.  In other words, isolated acts of punitiveness may 
prompt a societal move to adjust maximum penalties down-
ward across the board.  This too is a type of mercy. 
*  *  *  *  *  
The benefits described above are not the only benefits that 
will flow from ending the monopoly public prosecutors have on 
criminal cases and from restoring agency to victims of crime, 
and by extension, to all of us.  One can readily think of other 
benefits, such as enhancing participatory citizenship232 in a 
way that merely electing prosecutors does not.233  There is even 
reason to believe that ending the monopoly public prosecutors 
have on justice may have a deterrent effect when it comes to 
criminal offending.234  Restoring agency to victims can even 
have an impact on policing.235  And these are just some of the 
benefits.  Again, “[s]ince subject position is everything in my 
analysis of the law,”236 allow me to add two more that resonate 
with my own work: This project is deeply feminist and this 
project is consonant with Critical Race Theory.  At this time, 
when female victims of crime are less likely to be granted 
from as bakery. See Antonia Noori Farzan, He Stole $50 and Got Life Without 
Parole.  35 Years Later, He’s Coming Home, WASH. POST (Aug. 29, 2019, 6:34 AM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2019/08/29/alvin-kennard-theft-
years-alabama/ [https://perma.cc/QW6G-YDVF]. 
232 As Nils Christie observes, the ability to exercise agency in seeking justice 
after victimization represents “a potential for activity, for participation.”  Christie, 
supra note 118, at 7. 
233 See Ronald F. Wright, How Prosecutor Elections Fail Us, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. 
L. 581, 582 (2009) (noting that incumbent prosecutors rarely face challengers; 
this means voters rarely “learn about the incumbent’s performance in office . . . to 
make an informed judgment about the quality of criminal enforcement in their 
district”). Consider too the recent revelation that a union representing corrections 
officers is the biggest contributor to the election campaign of District Attorney 
Darcel Clark in New York. See Ese Olumhense & Josefa Velasquez, Correction 
Officers Are Top Donors to Unopposed Bronx DA Darcel Clark, CITY (Nov. 4, 2019), 
https://thecity.nyc/2019/11/correction-officers-are-top-donors-to-bronx-da-
darcel-clark.html [https://perma.cc/2ZC6-J55J]. 
234 Consider, as but one example, the problem of sexual assault.  One reason 
so few victims come forward is because of their justified skepticism that anything 
will be done. See discussion supra accompanying notes 18–21.  Perpetrators of 
sexual violence likely know this.  However, this dynamic could change if perpetra-
tors realized that victims themselves could make a showing of probable cause to a 
judge to secure an arrest warrant, could make their case before the grand jury to 
pursue an indictment—in short, that victims could seek justice directly. 
235 A system in which victims can bring cases has the potential to redirect 
police resources to crimes that actual victims care about, rather than merely 
following the agenda of an elected prosecutor who need only appeal to a fraction of 
her constituents. 
236 WILLIAMS, supra note 11, at 3. 
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agency to make their own decisions, this project gives power to 
them.  At a time when minority victims are rarely heard, this 
project gives power to them.  It demonstrates a “commitment to 
radical critique of the law . . . and . . . radical emancipation by 
the law.”237  It recognizes that true change is possible only 
through a “fundamental interrogation of all power.”238  These 
too are benefits, and we should take them seriously.  And we 
should recognize that all of these benefits bring direct democ-
racy to criminal justice; and that in itself is a good thing. 
One can imagine other benefits as well once we empower 
people to reclaim prosecutorial agency.  To seek direct criminal 
recourse to vindicate harms to them.  To contest who is a victim 
and who is a perpetrator.  To contest what should be criminal-
ized and what should not.  Especially when we think of “the 
people” as meaning all of “the people,” including minorities and 
other individuals who have historically been relegated to the 
margins and who, even now, are not necessarily represented by 
majority rule.  There is a long history of marginalized individu-
als, through their own initiative, challenging the state and the 
status quo, pushing the law to “make America what America 
must become.”239  One has only to recall the many slaves such 
as Elizabeth Freeman, also known as Mum Bett, who acting on 
their own petitioned courts for their freedom.  Mum Bett was 
not only successful; her case also set in motion the abolish-
ment of slavery in Massachusetts.240  There is Homer Plessy, 
who deliberately sat in a white only car in Louisiana to chal-
lenge de jure racial segregation,241 and Fred Korematsu, who 
refused to report to a Japanese internment camp.242  There are 
people who acted individually and people who acted collec-
tively.  There are the women who in 1872 marched to the polls 
and voted knowing they would be arrested; and the hundreds 
of drag queens and gay men and women who on June 28, 1969, 
refused police orders to disperse the Stonewall Inn.243  Even on 
237 Derrick A. Bell, Who’s Afraid of Critical Race Theory?, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 
893, 899 (1995). 
238 Capers, supra note 192, at 27. 
239 JAMES  BALDWIN, FIRE  NEXT  TIME 24 (1963) (“[G]reat men have done great 
things here, and will again, and we can make America what America must 
become.”). 
240 See Massachusetts Constitution and the Abolition of Slavery, MASS.GOV, 
https://www.mass.gov/guides/massachusetts-constitution-and-the-abolition-
of-slavery [https://perma.cc/F74N-4KC2] (last visited Feb. 19, 2020). 
241 See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
242 See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
243 See Symposium, Stonewall at 25, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 277, 277–78 
(1994). 
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the criminal side, we are the beneficiaries of individuals who 
refused to accept the law from on high and instead insisted on 
the right to shape the law themselves.  Consider Clarence 
Gideon, of Gideon v. Wainwright244 fame, who handwrote his 
petition to appeal saying how unfair it was he’d been tried 
without the assistance of counsel.245  Or consider Dollree 
Mapp, of Mapp v. Ohio, who insisted that police should have a 
warrant before searching her home.246  To be sure, these indi-
viduals were reacting to state action.  But what if these individ-
uals, indeed everyone, had the power to seek justice without 
the intermediary—or more bluntly, without the court block-
ing—of a public prosecutor.  Imagine if Dollree Mapp had been 
empowered not just to verbally protest the warrantless search 
of her home but also to argue that the officer’s reaching into her 
bosom was a battery.  Imagine if she was empowered to argue 
that the warrantless search should itself be criminal.  Imagine 
too if Epstein’s sexual assault victims—all outsiders, all rela-
tively powerless—had been empowered to demand account of 
him and to say themselves what they thought was criminal.  All 
of this could contribute to what Lani Guinier and Gerald Torres 
call “demosprudence,” meaning action instigated by “ordinary 
people” to change “the people who make the law and the land-
scape in which that law is made.”247  In her examination of 
criminal cases in North Carolina and South Carolina in the 
decades after the Revolutionary War, Laura Edwards found 
something that to modern readers may sound strange: “Every-
one participated in the identification of offenses, the resolution 
of conflicts, and the definition of law.”248  Indeed, she found 
that even those most marginalized—women, children, poor 
whites, and slaves—had direct access to localized law and 
could shape that law.249  I said earlier that my goal is not to pay 
244 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (establishing a state’s obligation to provide counsel for 
those criminal defendants who cannot afford it.) 
245 Facts and Case Summary – Gideon v. Wainwright, ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF 
THE U.S. COURTS, https://www.uscourts.gov/educational-resources/educational-
activities/facts-and-case-summary-gideon-v-wainwright [https://perma.cc/ 
PA4A-57HQ] (last visited Apr. 6, 2020). 
246 367 U.S. 643, 644–46 (1961) (making the Fourth Amendment exclusionary 
rule binding on the states). 
247 Lani Guinier & Gerald Torres, Changing the Wind: Notes Towards a Demos-
prudence of Law and Social Movements, 123 YALE L.J. 2740, 2749–50 (2014). 
248 EDWARDS, supra note 173, at 7. 
249 Id. at 7, 82; see also id. at 65–66 (“ ‘The people’ did not exist as the abstrac-
tion that provided the basis for government . . . . They figured as flesh-and-blood 
individuals, whose presence and opinions informed the entire process: people 
constituted the legal process, and law was what emerged through their interac-
tions with one another. . . . [They saw] the legal system as something directly 
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obeisance or offer blind fealty to the past.  But clearly there are 
aspects of this past that are worth pursuing. 
Importantly, as we think about restoring prosecutorial 
agency to ourselves, we should be open to other changes that 
might follow.  For starters, we can imagine a corresponding 
expansion of the role of juries.250  For example, Josh Bowers 
has persuasively argued that grand juries should play a role in 
charging decisions.251  We might even see a revival of grand 
jury reports, a process by which grand juries can issue a report 
critical of a defendant in lieu of an indictment.252  Along a 
similar vein, Laura Appleman has persuasively argued that we 
should form “bail juries” to play a role in bail determinations253 
and that we should also give juries a role in plea bargaining.254 
And numerous scholars have called for juries to play a bigger 
role in sentencing,255 including the role of nullification.256 
connected to them, and they expected it to respond as such, wherever it might be 
located.”). 
250 See Laura I. Appleman, Local Democracy, Community Adjudication, and 
Criminal Justice, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1413, 1415–19 (2017) (discussing the power 
of early juries and how the jury trial served as “the conduit for the community’s 
expression of democratic justice”).  To be sure, the power of the grand jury has 
been drastically curtailed, reduced to a “rubber stamp.”  In a dissenting opinion, 
Justice Douglas even lamented that the grand jury, “having been conceived as a 
bulwark between the citizen and the Government, is now a tool of the Executive.” 
United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19, 23 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting).  However, 
there is no reason why the original power of the grand jury cannot be restored. 
This vision would also restore the grand jury to its proper screening function. 
Indeed, it has been said that grand juries during the colonial period exercised 
more independence than grand juries in England.  In brief, it was left “to the grand 
jury to ferret out wrongdoing and present accusations.”  Leipold, supra note 44, at 
283. 
251 Josh Bowers, The Normative Case for Normative Grand Juries, 47 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 319, 321, 329–35 (2012) (focusing on low-level mala prohibita 
crimes and proposing the use of misdemeanor grand juries to decide not just the 
technical question of whether probable cause exists but also “the normative ques-
tion of whether charges are reasonable”). 
252 Such reports were once common in public corruption cases as a way for a 
grand jury to note its displeasure with the actions of public officials in a manner 
short of an indictment. See SARA SUN BEALE & WILLIAM C. BRYSON, GRAND JURY LAW 
AND PRACTICE §§ 3.01, 3.03 (1986). 
253 Laura I. Appleman, Justice in the Shadowlands: Pretrial Detention, Punish-
ment, & the Sixth Amendment, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1297, 1363–66 (2012). 
254 Laura I. Appleman, The Plea Jury, 85 IND. L.J. 731, 741–50 (2010). 
255 See, e.g., Jenia Iontcheva, Jury Sentencing as Democratic Practice, 89 VA. L. 
REV. 311, 312–316 (2003) (arguing that jury sentencing makes sense from a 
historical, theoretical, and practical perspective); Morris B. Hoffman, The Case for 
Jury Sentencing, 52 DUKE L.J. 951, 953–56 (2003) (arguing that historical, consti-
tutional, empirical, and policy reasons call for jury sentencing); Adriaan Lanni, 
Jury Sentencing in Noncapital Cases: An Idea Whose Time Has Come (Again)?, 108 
YALE L.J. 1775 (1999) (arguing that jury sentencing would be the most effective 
means to implement contemporary sentencing goals). 
256 See Butler, supra note 172, at 679. 
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Still, one can imagine the push back.  To some, the idea of 
a world with fewer public prosecutors may conjure images of 
lawlessness or criminals run amok, even if history suggests 
otherwise.  As is the case whenever the status quo is called into 
question, there is sure to be hesitation.  But even that hesita-
tion should prompt us to think “why public prosecutors,” and 
to rethink the power we have given them.  Indeed, allow me to 
go a step further.  It is a foundational tenet of Critical Race 
Theory that we should always “ask the other question.”257  This 
includes asking, “[w]ho benefits from the status quo . . . ?”258 
Who benefits from the status quo of allowing public prosecu-
tors to decide what cases to pursue?  Who benefits when the 
predominance of public prosecutors enables the state to create 
a swath of victimless crimes and claim itself as the victim? 
Who benefits?  And who does not? 
Of course, there will be much work in implementing the 
change I have proposed.  But it is not impossible work.  There 
are examples elsewhere that we can look to and build on.  En-
gland and Wales provide mechanisms by which victims can 
seek administrative and judicial review of a public prosecutor’s 
decision to prosecute or not.259  Separate and apart from this 
ability to challenge prosecutorial decision making, England 
and Wales still permit citizens to initiate private prosecutions. 
In Poland and Germany, victims can function as secondary 
prosecutors to directly oversee public prosecutions.260  Both 
countries allow for victims to apply for legal aid so that they can 
be assisted by counsel.  Spain allows citizens to bring an 
acusación popular to prosecute delito publico.261´  There are 
countries where the families of homicide victims are the ones 
who decide whether to seek punishment, financial compensa-
tion, or forgiveness.262  In short, there are models to borrow 
from or to improve upon.  There is certainly interest.263  There 
257 Mari J. Matsuda, Beside My Sister, Facing the Enemy: Legal Theory Out of 
Coalition, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1183, 1189 (1991). 
258 Bennett Capers, Evidence Without Rules, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 867, 905 
(2018). 
259 Manikis, supra note 87, at 260–61. 
260 See Johanna Göhler, Victim Rights in Civil Law Jurisdictions, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF CRIMINAL PROCESS, supra note 87, at 267, 277–78. 
261 Id. at 277 n.65. 
262 See Manikis, supra note 87, at 257; see also M. Cherif Bassiouni, Quesa 
Crimes, in THE ISLAMIC CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 203, 203–08 (M. Cherif Bassiouni 
ed., 1982) (describing Quesas and Diyya systems where the victim, or his family, 
can demand punishment). 
263 For example, the Vera Institute of Justice is exploring the possibility of 
providing funding to select prosecutors’ offices so that those offices can explore 
implementing more radical, community-oriented ways of effecting justice.  (Phone 
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are examples here.264  There is precedent.  Again, private pros-
ecution is in our cultural DNA.  It is part of who we are.  More 
importantly, it is part of who we are capable of becoming. 
CONCLUSION 
Clearly, all is not right in our criminal system.  Our prisons 
are shockingly overcrowded.  Millions of people cycle through 
jails each year, the overwhelming majority for victimless 
crimes.  One in every three adults has a criminal record.  Yet at 
the same time, so many of the crimes that matter to victims go 
unaddressed.  One in three homicides in this country go un-
prosecuted.  Sexual assaults are hardly prosecuted at all.  One 
wonders if the word “justice” should be applied at all.  The 
question—really, the pressing question—is what can we do 
about it. 
The ambition of this Article has been to argue for a different 
way.  It has been to turn attention to the public prosecutors 
who wield power that can only be described as monopolistic, 
and surface how recent, indeed how contingent, public prose-
cutors are.  It has been to recall a time when victims, and by 
extension all of us, had the power to choose when to prosecute, 
and when to not.  And it has been to suggest that, in this 
criminal justice moment, we open ourselves up to the possibil-
ity of real change.  Radical change.  It is time to consider shift-
ing power from prosecutors to the people they purport to 
represent.  The benefits, after all, are manifold. 
call with Joseph Margulies, Professor of Law and Gov’t, Cornell University, regard-
ing Vera Institute project (Sept. 3, 2019). 
264 See supra notes 157–58, 169, 193, 250–56, 259–62. 
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